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Abstract
Security has become one of the most important concerns when designing Information Systems (IS).
In front of the increasing number of aspects of our life relying on network communication and on
computerized processes, and the explosing number of Internet attacks, the industries have to pro-
tect their assets against such risk. Even if the need of practical approaches to ensure that security
objectives are guaranteed is obvious, it seems that practitioners strain to take care about. The
reason is certainly that they are faced with hundreds of security standards, frameworks and meth-
ods. Each of them focuses on different aspects of the security and uses different terminologies,
leading to a situation without consensus between the practioners.
This lack of consensus and approaches to ensure security in IS motivates researchers to enrich
actual Security Risk Management (SRM) approaches and, in the same time, to investigate new
methods to manage security in systems. This thesis comes within the scope of N. Mayer's work
which investigates the IS Security Risk Management (ISSRM). This thesis contributes to the
elaboration of the ISSRM domain model by completing it with relationships between its concepts.
Secondly, it gives proposals to enhance the ISSRM domain model from results obtained from its
alignment with security modelling languages. Finally, it suggests how to improve these security
modelling languages in order to support all the concepts from the ISSRM domain model.
Keywords: Security Risk Management, ISSRM domain model, KAOS, secure TROPOS,
concepts alignment.
Résumé
La sécurité est devenue une des préoccupations essentielles lors de l'élaboration de Systèmes
d'Information (SI). Confrontées au nombre croissant d'aspects de notre vie qui reposent sur les
réseaux de communication et les processus informatisés, ainsi que le nombre exponentiel d'attaques
via Internet, les industries se doivent de protéger leurs assets. Même s'il est évident qu'ils ont
besoin d'approches pratiques assurant que les objectifs de sécurité sont atteints, les practiciens
peinent à s'y intéresser. La raison majeure est certainement qu'ils se retrouvent submergés par
des centaines de standards, de frameworks et de méthodes traitant de la sécurité. Chacun d'entre
eux se focalise sur un aspect différent de la sécurité en employant une terminologie distincte des
autres. Ceci aboutit à une situation où aucun consensus ne semble possible parmi les practiciens.
Ce manque de consensus et d'approches pour assurer la sécurité des SI motive les chercheurs à
enrichir les approches actuelles de gestion des risques de sécurité et, en même temps, à s'intéresser
à de nouvelles méthodes. Ce mémoire s'inscrit dans le cadre du travail de N. Mayer qui étudie
le Gestion des Risques de Sécurité des SI (GdR SSI). Ce mémoire contribue à l'élaboration de
l'ISSRM domain model en y intégrant des relations entre ses concepts. Deuxièmement, il fournit
des propositions pour améliorer l'ISSRM domain model à partir des résultats de son alignement
avec des langages de modélisation de la sécurité. Finalement, il suggère des perfectionnements
à apporter à ces langages de modélisation de la sécurité afin qu'ils prennent en compte tous les
concepts de l'ISSRM domain model.
Mots clés : Gestion des risques de sécurité, ISSRM domain model, KAOS, secure TROPOS,
alignement de concepts.

Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Nicolas Mayer for his hospitality during my internship at the Centre de
Recherche Public Henri Tudor in the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg. Thanks to his guidance,
his availability and his general help.
I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Patrick Heymans and Dr. Raimundas
Matulevi£ius, my supervisors at the University of Namur, for their support in determining the
objectives of this work and helping me to reach them. I would also like to thank them for all their
insightful remarks on the many drafts of this thesis.
I acknowledge the Centre de Recherche Public Henri Tudor and the University of Namur for
their warm welcome and for the place they gave me to work.
A special thanks to Germain Saval, Jean-Christophe Trigaux, Alain Vagner and Luc Dehand
for the very interesting discussions that we had.
I would also like to acknowledge Laurence Mathu who used her talents to correct my English
and Jean-François Wauthy who improved the layout of this thesis.
Je tiens aussi à remercier Amélie et ma famille pour tout ce qu'ils ont fait pour moi durant la
préparation de ce mémoire.

Contents
Contents i
List of Figures v
List of Tables ix
Foreword xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Security Concerns in Information Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 The Rise of Security Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 Building a New RM Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.3 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.4 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
I Background 5
2 Information System and Requirements Engineering 7
2.1 Information System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Software Design Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Requirements Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Early Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Security and Risk Management 11
3.1 Security Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Risk Management Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3 Risk Management Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3.1 Context and Assets Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3.2 Security Objectives to Reach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3.3 Risk Analysis / Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3.4 Security Requirements Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3.5 Controls Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3.6 Controls Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
i
ii Contents
4 Research Method for Designing ISSRM-compliant Languages 17
4.1 Step 1: Concept Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.2 Step 2: Construction of ISSRM Domain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3 Step 3: Comparison between ISSRM Domain Model and Security-oriented Languages 19
4.4 Step 4: ISSRM Language Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5 Analysis of Security and Risk related Sources 21
5.1 State of the Art of the Security and Risk related Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1.1 Risk Management Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1.2 (IS/IT) Security Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1.3 Risk Management Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1.4 SE Security Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2 Grid of Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.3 Glossary of Key Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6 ISSRM Domain Model 29
6.1 Definition of ISSRM Domain Model Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.1.1 Asset-related Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.1.2 Risk-related Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.1.3 Risk Treatment-related Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2 Relationships and Multiplicities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2.1 Asset-related Relationships and Multiplicities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2.2 Risk-related Relationships and Multiplicities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2.3 Risk Treatment-related Relationships and Multiplicities . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7 Security Modelling Languages 35
7.1 KAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1.1 Introduction to KAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1.2 Introduction to KeS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.1.3 Illustration of KAOS and KeS in the Banking Services Example . . . . . . 38
7.2 Secure TROPOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.2.1 Introduction to TROPOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.2.2 Secure TROPOS : Security Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.3 Misuse Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.4 Abuse Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.5 Abuse Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
II Contribution 53
8 Eliciting ISSRM Relationships 55
8.1 Improve Relevant Concepts Comprehension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.2 Relationships Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8.3 Structure of the Relationship Explanation Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8.4 From Theory to Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.4.1 Elicitation of Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.4.2 UML Class Diagram of Concepts Completed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.4.3 Creation of the ISSRM Domain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.4.4 Validation of Relationship Elicitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
8.5 Other standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Contents iii
8.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
9 Alignment of KeS and Secure TROPOS with the ISSRM Domain Model 67
9.1 Step 3 of the Research Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
9.2 Alignment of KeS with the ISSRM Domain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
9.3 Secure TROPOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
9.3.1 Secure TROPOS Metamodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
9.3.2 eSAP Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
9.3.3 Alignment of Secure TROPOS and the ISSRM Domain Model . . . . . . . 90
9.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
III Evaluation 101
10 Validation 103
10.1 Objectives of the Exploitation of the Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
10.2 The Meeting Scheduler Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
10.3 Exploitation of the Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
10.3.1 Analysis of the Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
10.3.2 Observation of the Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
10.3.3 Threats to Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
10.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
IV Conclusions 133
11 Conclusions and Future Work 135
11.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
11.1.1 Conclusions on the Method used to fulfill the Objectives of the Thesis . . . 136
11.1.2 Conclusions on the results of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
11.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
11.2.1 Development of the ISSRM domain model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
11.2.2 Future Investigations in the Secure TROPOS and the KeS Languages . . . 137
Bibliography 139

List of Figures
1 CRPHT Logo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
2 Organisational structure of the CRPHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
3 CITI Operating Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
2.1 Waterfall development process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1 Risk Management process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 The different risk areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1 Global research method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1 Global EBIOS process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2 MEHARI process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3 Main steps of OCTAVE process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4 Excerpt of the grid of concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.5 Excerpt of the glossary of concepts definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.1 ISSRM domain model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.1 KAOS metamodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.2 Graphical representation of KAOS and KeS concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.3 Excerpt of the Goal model of the Banking Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.4 Operation model of the operationalization of the Requirement Achieve [Money-
TakenOnlyByBankCustomer] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.5 Anti-goal model of an attacker against the Banking Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.6 Operationalization of the Attacker's Requirement Achieve [CheckIteratedOn-
OtherAccountsIfNoMatch] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.7 Graphical representation of TROPOS concepts used in SDM . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.8 Example of SDM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.9 Graphical representation of TROPOS relationships used in SRM . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.10 Example of SRM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.11 The secure TROPOS graphical syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.12 Misuse case example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.13 Abuse case example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.14 A Generic Abuse frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.1 UML association relationship (from EBIOS v2 Class diagram) . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8.2 UML aggregation relationship (from EBIOS v2 Class diagram) . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8.3 UML inheritance relationship (from EBIOS v2 Class diagram) . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8.4 Direct elicitation of the existence of the relationship in source document . . . . . . 57
v
vi List of Figures
8.5 Concept that require interpretation to understand the relationship in source document 58
8.6 EBIOS v2 terminology summarized in the concept grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.7 UML Class diagram of EBIOS v2 before relationships elicitation . . . . . . . . . . 59
8.8 Complete UML Class diagram of EBIOS v2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
9.1 Comparison between ISSRM domain model and security-oriented languages . . . . 68
9.2 Alignment of KeS with ISSRM domain model (focus on risk- and assets-related
concepts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
9.3 Alignment of KeS with ISSRM domain model (focus on risk treatment-related con-
cepts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
9.4 The UML class diagram specifying the actor concept in the TROPOS metamodel . 74
9.5 The UML class diagram specifying the goal concept in the TROPOS metamodel . 75
9.6 The UML class diagram specifying the Plan/Task concept in the TROPOS metamodel 76
9.7 The secure TROPOS metamodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
9.8 GRL metamodel: Zoom on intentional elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
9.9 GRL metamodel: Zoom on intentional relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
9.10 Our secure TROPOS metamodel: Zoom on secure TROPOS concepts . . . . . . . 81
9.11 Our secure TROPOS metamodel: Zoom on the different types of secure TROPOS
relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
9.12 Our secure TROPOS metamodel: Zoom on the secure TROPOS relationships com-
ponents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
9.13 Illegal contribution of a Goal to a Softgoal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
9.14 Underlying concepts used to express the contribution relationship from a Goal to a
Softgoal using our secure TROPOS metamodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
9.15 Example of the decomposition of a Goal into sub-goals following the TROPOS
metamodel (AND or OR decomposition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
9.16 Expression of the decomposition of a Goal into sub-goals following our secure TRO-
POS metamodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
9.17 Example representing the expression of an OR decomposition following our secure
TROPOS metamodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
9.18 Elicitation of the dependencies between the eSAP system and a Patient . . . . . . 86
9.19 Presentation of the relationship between the Social Worker and the eSAP system 87
9.20 eSAP system internal structure refinement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
9.21 Investigation of the security risk against the eSAP system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
9.22 Merging of all elicited eSAP internal elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
9.23 Internal structure of an attack against the Resource on the behalf of the eSAP system 90
9.24 Refinement of countermeasures to mitigate revealed risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
9.25 Mental representation of a secure TROPOS Threat as including the Attacker actor
and his internal structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
9.26 Alignment of secure TROPOS concepts with ISSRM risk- and assets-related concepts 98
9.27 Alignment of secure TROPOS concepts with ISSRM focusing on risk-related concepts 98
9.28 Alignment of secure TROPOS concepts with ISSRM risk treatment-related concepts 99
10.1 Overview of the meeting scheduler system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
10.2 Secure TROPOS modelling of meeting initiator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.3 Secure TROPOS modelling of meeting participant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
10.4 Secure TROPOS modelling of meeting scheduler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
10.5 Secure TROPOS modelling of meeting scheduler system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
10.6 Adding security Constraints on the meeting scheduler system . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
10.7 Security constraints and related elements in the meeting scheduler . . . . . . . . . 109
10.8 Elicitation of risks against security constraints and security criteria of the meeting
scheduler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
10.9 Meeting scheduler extended with privacy related elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
10.10Meeting scheduler extended with availability related elements . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
List of Figures vii
10.11Meeting scheduler extended with integrity related elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
10.12Internal structure of the attacker against meeting scheduler privacy . . . . . . . . . 113
10.13Countermeasure against disclosure of agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
10.14Complete goal model of the Meeting scheduler system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
10.15Meeting scheduler system refined until Requirements and Expectations: focus on
the initiator Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
10.16Meeting scheduler system refined until Requirements and Expectations: focus on
the participant Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
10.17Meeting scheduler system refined until Requirements and Expectations: focus on
the scheduler Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
10.18Refinement of the goal Agreement on meeting M schedule received . . . . . . 119
10.19Operationalization of Requirement DisclosureOfAgreementDateToUnauthorized-
Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
10.20Refinement of the goal Agreeable slot for meeting M found . . . . . . . . . . . 120
10.21Object model of the meeting scheduler system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
10.22Goal model of the privacy attacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
10.23Operationalization of the attacker's requirement Achieve [ReaDate] . . . . . . . . 123
10.24Operationalization of the attacker's requirement Achieve [CopyDate] . . . . . . . 124
10.25Operationalization of the attacker's requirement Achieve [StoreStolenDate] . . 124
10.26Anti-object model for the privacy attacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
10.27Goal model extended with countermeasures against privacy attack . . . . . . . . . 125
10.28Operationalization of the requirement AgreementsAreEncrypted . . . . . . . . . . 126

List of Tables
5.1 Four categories of security and risk related sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.1 Elicitation of relationships between concepts of Assets block . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
8.2 Elicitation of relationships between concepts of Risk block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8.3 Elicitation of relationships between concepts of Assets block and Risk block . . . . 62
8.4 Elicitation of relationships of concepts of Countermeasures block . . . . . . . . . . 63
8.5 Elicitation of Relationships between Concepts of Countermeasures and Risk Blocks 63
9.1 Correspondence between the ISSRM risk treatment decisions and KeS countermea-
sures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
9.2 Alignment between KeS and the ISSRM domain model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
9.3 Alignment between secure TROPOS and the ISSRM domain model . . . . . . . . . 96
10.1 Modelling of main elements of meeting scheduler case study using the secure TRO-
POS and KeS languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
ix

Foreword
My internship took place at the Centre de Recherche Public Henri Tudor in Luxembourg. We
described briefly the organisational structure of the research center.
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The Centre de Recherche Public Henri Tudor (CRPHT), whose description is based on
http://www.tudor.lu and logo is presented in Fig. 1, is a public organisation of private law
situated in the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg. It is upheld by a large industrial and institutional
partnership. Founded in 1987, it aims to favour technological innovation in private and public
sectors. It offers a set of services and activities : R&D projects, technologies transfer, technological
assistance and guidance, high level training and qualification, thesis research, innovation networks
animation, assistance in the creation of high-tech entreprises.
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As we can see on Fig. 2, the CRPHT is composed of eight departments :
• the Laboratoire de Technologies Industrielles et Matériaux (LTI);
• the Centre d'Innovation par les Technologies de l'Information (CITI);
• the Centre de Ressources des Technologies pour l'Environnement (CRTE);
• the Centre de Ressources des Technologies pour la Santé (CR SANTEC);
• the Centre de Ressources des Technologies de l'Information pour le Bâtiment (CRTI-B);
• the Service de Formation continue de l'Ingénieur et du Cadre, SITec R©;
• the Centre de Veille Technologique et Normative (CVT), l'incubateur d'entreprises de tech-
nologies innovantes ou Technoport.
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Departments are themselves composed by :
• the plates-formes d'innovation (PFI) that regroup around a national strategical aim, a
pallet of partners and a lot of multidisciplinary research and transfer activities;
• the unités scientifiques et technologiques (UST) made up of specialized research, associated
RDI and valuation activities;
• the unités de services pour l'innovation.
My training took place in the offices of the centre d'innovation par les technologies de l'infor-
mation (CITI). Its aim is to lead, by research and guidance in the domain of innovation, the
economy of Luxembourg to the most promising ICT applications. Direct support to partners and
developing a network of the innovation actors of Luxembourg constitute the main objectives of
this department. CITI counts more than a hundred R&D engineers shared out among five USTs
and five PFIs as described in Fig. 3.
These five USTs are:
• Knowledge Economy and Innovation Management;
• Software Engineering;
• Innovation Project Management;
• Management of Organisations and IT Services;
• Reference Systems for Modelling and Certification.
The five PFIs are:
• Quality and Certification of Computer Services;
• Information Systems Security;
• Interoperability standards and E-Business;
• E-Learning, Knowledge Management and Networked Organisations;
• Statistical Studies and Prospective in the Knowledge Economy;
CITI's competences are in the following domains :
• Information Systems Security, e-Business, e-Learning, Knowledge Management, Workflow;
• Innovation Strategies, Network of Innovation and learning organisations;
• Computerized exploitation models, Project Management, Improvement and Certification of
computerized processes, Provider/Consumer relationship;
• Requirement Engineering, process modelling, software architecture and interoperability.
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Figure 2: Organisational structure of the CRPHT (adapted from http://www.tudor.lu)
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Chapter1
Introduction
1.1 Security Concerns in Information Systems
Security . This word reflects the state of mind of our present-day society and not only in
Information Technology (IT) environments. Our society tries to take measures to insure security
in all circumstances of our daily life: for example, highway code, evacuation planning, military
training and security norms. Peculiarly after the extreme increase of Web attacks, IT specialists
became aware of the significance of dealing with security in IT environments. From the beginning
of computer sciences, failures in running systems were considered as inherent to IT systems, due to
the fact that perfection is rather unreachable. Failures are bugs that are corrected during testing
phases and when systems are already running. However, security concerns cannot be considered
as failure in the running process of the software. They have to be viewed as system properties.
For this reason, Risk Management (RM) has to be present in each step of the development of an
Information System (IS), from the earliest context analysis to the implementation and deployment
of the IT solution.
However, making a new exhaustive elicitation of the potential risks is quite impossible. It is al-
ways possible to find a potential risk. Indeed, it is not rare to see that the solution adopted against
a specific risk leads to the introduction of a new security risk. Computer analysts/specialists need
methods to reveal potential security risks and they need knowledge, methods and tools to decide
which are the revelant risks to consider.
The context around IS and their related risks is paramount. IS exist in business environments
where making business is the first and the most important occupation. Risk assessment is con-
strained by financial means. Experts talk about Return On Investments (ROI). The use of a
method is always constrained by its envisioned ROI.
Another problem has to be addressed: at which step(s) of IS development does RM have to be
taken into account? Usually, risk countermeasures are added as a layer over the business code of
a software. This happens for mainly two reasons: first, legacy but still used systems have been
designed without taking into account security concerns and thus security has to be implemented
as a layer above the current business code. The second reason is that achieving a fully working
system requires a large amount of time and adding security concerns also only increases it. IT
specialists are under pressure to deliver running systems in time, and thus they often consider
security as a possible extension to the software they are developing. Security is seen as a wish,
not as a requirement. Adding a new security layer above running systems permits to increase
its security level without having to redesign the entire system. But such a practice has also a
recurrent problem: the chosen countermeasures are deployed with huge difficulties and are not
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always as suitable as possible to the corresponding risks. Software engineers have already drawn
attention to the fact that the sooner a concept is investigated during software development, the
cheaper the cost of its implementation will be.
Nowadays, according to [MH06], more than two hundred RM methods have been reported.
Although a lot of these methods have been discarded for different reasons (no more supported,
too abstract, too rigid, only guidelines), some are still supported by different organisations. This
is a real proof of the current attention on security risks in IS. Unfortunately, these methods use
some identical words with heterogeneous semantics and they do not tackle problems with the same
process. This results in a large variety of RM methods in which practitioners try to make their
way, taking some aspects from their favourite methods. But a RM method used in a given context
cannot be easily reused in another. It is also difficult to migrate from a RM method (which is, for
example, not anymore supported) to another one.
This special RM context shows the need for a RM method applicable from the earliest IS
engineering phases. Such a method is currently being developed in the scope of a Ph.D. thesis by
M. Nicolas Mayer. N. Mayer is a computer engineer working at the Centre de Recherche Public
Henri Tudor (CRPHT), where my internship took place. He conducts research on the devel-
opment of an Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) domain model. Before
asking which are the different components of the ISSRM domain model, we will gather all relevant
reasons that justify the need of such a domain model. We have already introduced some of these
reasons and we will complete this analysis.
1.1.1 The Rise of Security Concerns
All actions we undertake in our all days life rely more and more on network communications and
computerized operations. In the same time, the number of attacks against Web components has
an important increasing. Confronted to such a huge threat, industries and institutions became
aware of the need to secure their assets. The threat is not new but its scale is a new contest
concerning all analysts and developers of IS. The first response to the need of security and, in a
broader view, to the need of RM was to add a security layer above existing systems. As we said
before, this solution is quite imperfect and leads to hard to maintain systems. At the same
time, the need of RM methods was identified and this domain was investigated. More than two
hundred methods (see [MH06]) were created. However, from a situation in which IT specialists
were disarmed, we reached another one in which these specialists are overflowed by the amount
of different RM methods and, finally, no method succeeded to make itself the reference in RM
domain. To explain the failure of finding a leader RM method, we need to investigate the RM
phases covered by each of them. RM can be divided into three phases: a) risk analysis, b) security
requirements elicitation and c) implementation and management of countermeasures. [Maytz]
explicitly shows that only a very small subset of RM methods cover the entire RM process. The
fact that methods that covered all phases did not become leader could be that a) they were too
difficult to put into practice and b) they gathered no consensus among security specialists. So the
main issues that a new RM method has to address are a) covering the entire RM process from
risk analysis to implementation and management of countermeasures and b) being accepted by
security and RM specialists.
1.1.2 Building a New RM Standard
Building a new RM standard requires to address the two issues previously discussed. This is
what the ISSRM domain model developed by N. Mayer aims to do. To resolve the first issue a),
N. Mayer elaborated a research method (discussed in detail in Chapter 4). This research method
begins by analysing the most relevant and still supported RM standards (described in Chapter 5).
After that, he gathers and aligns concepts from each of the retained RM standards in order to
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obtain the relevant RM concepts. Once these concepts and the relationships between them have
been elicited, a new metamodel is designed, using these concepts.
The second issue, making our new RM standard accepted by RM specialists, is intrinsically
linked with N. Mayer's research method. Indeed, as we will see in the sequel, intermediate versions
of the RM standard will be repeatedly submitted to RM specialists, especially regarding to the
alignment of concepts of the most current RM standards.
1.1.3 Objectives
My contribution to the research method tackles three different problems:
1. to investigate relationships between ISSRM domain model concepts that were elicited in
previous works in order to complete and improve the ISSRM domain model;
2. to analyse how existing security modelling languages consider security concerns. We analyse
what are the ISSRM domain model concepts that are treated in security modelling languages;
3. to elicit potential improvements of the ISSRM domain model  depending on the results of
the analysis of security modelling languages  and also potential improvements to security
modelling languages in order to make them support ISSRM concepts.
1.1.4 Overview
Chapter 2 aims to define foundational concepts for the rest of the thesis. These concepts are
IS, Requirements Engineering (RE), Software Design Lifecycle (SDL) and Early Requirements.
Chapter 3 focuses on the notions of security, Risk Management and RM process. The research
method is presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concerns the state of the art of the security and
risk related sources, and some material resulting from initial steps of research method. Chapter 6
defines the ISSRM domain model. An introduction to security modelling languages is given in
Chapter 7. Chapter 8 concerns the alignment of security modelling languages with the ISSRM
domain model, and Chapter 9 validates the alignment with a case study. The validation and
results obtained from the case study as discussed in Chapter 10. We finish the thesis with an
investigation of future works.

Part I
Background
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Chapter2
Information System and Requirements
Engineering
In this chapter, we introduce foundational notions for the rest of the thesis such as Infor-
mation System and Requirements Engineering and other related terms.
2.1 Information System
Following [Hey] and [BP89] the term Information System (IS) describes what the organisa-
tions conceive, realise and exploit to satisfy their need of information due to their organisational
behaviours. An IS is composed of:
• information which is a partial representation of facts interesting for the organisation;
• information acquisition, memorization, transformation, search, presentation and communi-
cation processes;
• organisational rules that govern the execution of informational processing;
• human and technical resources required to make the IS work.
An IS can be computer-based, but does not need to be so. However, in the sequel of this
thesis, we will use the term IS as a synonym of computerized IS. Indeed, the environments in
which IS are currently developed are of Software-Intensive Systems. That is, systems com-
posed of hardware and software but also human operators. The fact is that software on its own
is useless because it needs to be executed on a hardware product. We call Computer System
the set composed of the software and the hardware. However, Computer System is still, on its
own, useless. It is only useful in an environment where it supports human activities. This thesis
investigates the security of (computerized) IS.
To achieve a good IS  which is an IS that fully fulfills purposes it was built for  an engineering
process is mandatory. Requirements Engineering, discussed in the next section, is an inevitable
part of such a process.
2.2 Software Design Lifecycle
IS is thus composed of several facets. In this section we focus on the software system. The
global process aiming to develop software facet of IS is called the SoftwareDesign Lifecycle (SDL).
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The most common system development activities are detailed in [Som01]. The common process
includes four main stages:
1. software specification: consists in the definition of functionalities of the software and
constraints on its operation;
2. software development: consists in the building of the software that meets specifications;
3. software validation: consists in the validation of the system by checking if the software
makes what the customer needs;
4. software evolution: consists in the changes of the system to follow alterations in customers'
needs.
Several decompositions of the four activities are possible and different development processes
exist such as waterfall, spiral, prototyping, operational, transformational, the knowledge-based
and domain-based models. As the purpose of the thesis is not focused on software engineering, we
just illustrate the functioning of SDL by investigating the waterfall process.
Waterfall Development Process
The waterfall development process considers system development as successive stepwise trans-
formations, from the description of the problem domain to a solution. Each step has to be
successfully fulfilled before considering the next phase.However it is always possible to go back to
the last step. The waterfall development process is depicted in Fig. 2.1. It contains five activities:
Requirements
specification
System and 
software design
Implementation
and unit testing
Integration and
 system testing
Operation and
maintenance
Figure 2.1: Waterfall development process (adapted from [Som01])
1. Requirements specification: interactions with system users lead to the identification of
system's services, constraints and goals. They are refined in order to be used as a specifica-
tion;
2. System and software design: the system design process partitions the requirements to
either hardware or software systems [Som01]. This activity draws the overall architecture of
the system. Software design involves identifying and describing the fundamental software
system abstractions and their relationships [Som01].
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3. Implementation and unit testing: the software design is implemented as a set of pro-
grams. The unit testing involves verifying that each program corresponds to its specification;
4. Integration and system testing: all programs are gathered and a complete system test
is run in order to ensure that the system meets its specification. The software system is then
ready to be deployed in the customer's organisation;
5. Operation and maintenance: this activity focuses on the improvements of software sys-
tem functionalities in order a) to remove bugs that were not discovered during unit and
system testing and b) to align functionalities when customers' needs change.
2.3 Requirements Engineering
If building an IS is a quite difficult work, building an IS that really fulfills the purposes defined
by all the stakeholders is an even harder one.
As said in [EN03], Requirements Engineering (RE) is a set of activities concerned with
identifying and communicating the purpose of a software-intensive system, and the con-
texts in which it will be used. Hence, RE acts as the bridge between the real world needs of
users, customers, and other constituencies affected by a software system, and the capabilities
and opportunities afforded by software intensive technologies.
It emerges from this definition that:
1. RE is an ongoing process through the entire process, not only a stage or a phase;
2. communication is a really important part of the RE;
3. understanding the purpose of the system to build is at the heart of the success of the
RE;
4. designers need to know how and where the system to build will be used;
5. on the one hand, requirements are partly about what is needed, and on the other hand
about what it is possible to do;
6. all stakeholders need to be identified, not only users and customers.
In the context of IS development, security has to be considered as a requirement. It has to
find its place in the global RE process.
2.4 Early Requirements
The present thesis focuses mainly on the Early Requirements phase.Early Requirements is con-
cerned with the analysis of the operational environment where a software system will eventually
function. For organizational software, this environment consists of stakeholders and their objec-
tives, business processes, and inter-dependencies.
Early Requirements is often supported by modelling languages. The most frequent are:
• goal modelling languages such as KAOS [MMHD07] and i∗ [BGG+04];
• context and problem diagrams such as Problem Frames [Jac01]
• use cases [Jac92].
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we defined foundamental concepts for the rest of the thesis. We first described
the notions of Information System (IS). We presented, in a general way, how the software com-
ponent of an IS is elaborated and we focused on the waterfall development process. We also
introduced the notion of Early Requirements because the thesis focuses essentially on this stage
of the elaboration of an IS.
Chapter3
Security and Risk Management
We define in this chapter the meaning of the terms security and Risk Management (RM).
3.1 Security Definition
Security is a word heavily used in all domains of our society. In this thesis, we focus on secu-
rity in the context of IS. In [Pie07], security is described as the prevention and the detection
of unauthorized actions on information. In this definition, the main element to be protected
is the information. In [Fir03], Firesmith points out two main concepts making a system sure: a)
the safety and b) the security of this system. The difference is that safety concerns accidental
harm while security concerns malicious harm. Firesmith introduces the notion of valuable asset
where Piessens focuses on information. In the sequel of the thesis, we will focus on the concept of
security.
To summarize, we can say that security is about all harms, accidental or malicious, that
threaten valuable assets of the IS. We will developed this definition in the sequel of the thesis.
3.2 Risk Management Definition
Risk Management (RM) is defined by ISO1 in [ISO02] as the set of coordinated activities to
direct and control an organisation with regard to risk. RM has three main objectives:
• to improve IS security;
• to justify the budget allocated to IS security;
• to prove the IS's credibility thanks to completed analyses.
This concept was born at the end of the fifties in the USA in financial domain in relationship
to solving insurance questions as described in [Dub96]. Afterwards, this notion spread over other
domains as environment, project management, marketing and computer security. RM tries to
identify risks on the assets of an enterprise. The term asset must be taken in a broad sense: not
only material things but also people, employees, knowledge of the enterprise. RM is an important
process due to the fact that results regarding security reflect on the quality of the enterprise in
general. Good results beget confidence of customers, partners, shareholders.
1International organisation for Standardization
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Nowadays, we estimate that there are more than two hundred of Risk Management Methods
(RMM) (according to [MH06]). Such a multiplicity of methods leads to a great diversity of RM
approaches. But we can define a set of basic common concepts to all RMMs.
3.3 Risk Management Process
We now describe the RM process at quite a high-level. The discussed process is usually found in
one form or another in practical RMMs. On the other hand, the terminologies are not completely
aligned within these different methods. The process can be broken down into six successive steps
described below in Fig. 3.1. This description is inspired from [MH06].
Context
identification
and assets
Risk analysis /
assessment
Security 
requirements
definition
Security
to reach
objectives
Controls
implementation
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Controls selection
Figure 3.1: Risk Management process (adapted from [MH06])
3.3.1 Context and Assets Identification
The first step (a) in Fig. 3.1 consists of the context and assets identification. During this phase,
the analyst has to learn information about the organisation, focusing on the actors, manipulated
data, assets, organisation's environment, organisation IS. After this learning, the first step contin-
ues by defining the system boundaries on which the risk management study will be realised. Once
these boundaries have been identified, business assets  assets that constitute the organisation
value  are identified. For each business asset, links are established with IS assets. These IS assets
have to be identified and analysed, searching for risks from the technical and organisational points
of view.
To illustrate this RM process, a case study described in [MH06] is analysed and, for each step
of the RM process, a practical example is given.
Example: in the step (a), the context and assets identification teaches us that the case study is
about an e-business website and this site has a database containing banking information about its
customers.
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3.3.2 Security Objectives to Reach
The second step (b)  security objectives to reach  intends to determine the security objectives
in terms of availability, confidentiality and integrity, focusing on the business point of view. Other
security criteria can be considered but the three discussed here are the most relevant in the
practical risk management methods. Once the link between business assets and IS assets previously
identified, this step defines security needs of the analysed system.
Example: by making links between business assets and IS assets, it appears that this database has
relevant needs from the point of view of confidentiality due to the information's sensitivity.
3.3.3 Risk Analysis / Assessment
Risk analysis, also called risk assessment, is the third step of the RM process. Its purposes
are the identification and the assessment of the three risk components: the threat, the exploited
vulnerability (vulnerabilities) and the resulting impact(s). This leads to the risk assessment and
to the estimation of its level in order to take the right measures. The assessment can be realised
following two methods:
1. to make an audit of the system and of the different actors;
2. to consult a pre-defined knowledge database.
In theory, it is possible to quantify risk by statistical distributions on threats and on vulnerabil-
ities and by estimating costs resulting from impacts. In practical situations, it is often impossible
to give a precise value to estimate a risk. Risk levels are assessed and measured following a specific
scale. Using such a scale, it is possible to situate the assessed risk value on a figure such as Fig. 3.2.
Good practices use this division:
• negligible area: risks having low level of occurrence and low impact are inconsequential;
• no existing risk: risks having high level of occurrence and high impact are not accept-
able. These risks need to be avoided. Otherwise, the organisation's activities have to be
reconsidered if this situation occurs;
• accepted risk: risks having high level of occurrence but a low impact are accepted. Their
cost is generally included in operational costs of the organisation;
• risk to be transferred: risks having low level of occurrence but a high impact have to be
transferred. The responsibility is covered by an insurance or a third party;
• risk to reduce: other risks are considered individually and at the heart of the risk man-
agement. The aim is to mitigate these risks. That is illustrated on the following diagram
Fig. 3.2 but bringing it near the axis origin.
This estimation makes possible to determine the most acceptable risk, before eliciting security
requirements.
Example: risk analysis reveals several risk scenarios having an acceptable risk level for the cus-
tomers' information in the database. One of them is the access to information by non-authorized
actors through the network. In this case, data confidentiality could be broken. This risk needs to
be treated by security controls.
3.3.4 Security Requirements Definition
The next step (d) is the one defining the security requirements that have to be taken into
account to reduce the different risks. This step can lie on a knowledge database or can be exchanged
by experts in system / in security. The complexity and the significance of the security requirements
elicitation makes this process an incremental process. Starting with the definition of a high-level
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constant risk
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Figure 3.2: The different risk areas (adapted from [MH06])
risk (strategic level), searching for security requirements to counter it is a good way to start the risk
management method. Indeed, this first high-level risk will be refined into more precise, practical
risks of lower level (towards the operational level). These mitigation requirements are defined on
the computerized system but also on its environment.
Example: the server, that hosts the customer database, needs to be protected from any kind of
intrusions. At the same time, access control contrivance is placed on the database. A stronger
remote authentication other than only a pair <login, password> is required. However, the cost and
the simplicity of the use have to stay at an acceptable level.
3.3.5 Controls Selection
The last level of refinement is considered in the fifth step (e). This refinement results in control
selection, also called countermeasures. Controls are the implementation of the lowest level of se-
curity requirements. The technical choices of the security solutions constrained by the established
system are defined in this phase.
Example: an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is added to the current firewall. A authenti-
cation policy, stronger than <login,password> is chosen. This new policy combines a pair <lo-
gin,password> with a code distributed to the customer during his registration. An authentication
by card is considered to be too restricting.
3.3.6 Controls Implementation
The last step (f) contains information about the control implementation in the IS. These
controls can be evaluated and tested. The part of risks not covered by controls or introduced by
the control implementation is called the residual risk.
Example: the computer service will put in place an IDS and the company that hosts the website
will develop a new portal supporting the required authentication process.
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3.4 Summary
We defined the notion of security and Risk Management (RM). We also analysed the RM
process which is composed of six successive steps starting from context and assets identification
and finishing with the implementation of controls. In this process, we discussed the different
decisions that an enterprise can take when it is confronted to a risk. These decisions depend on
the security strategy of the enterprise.

Chapter4
Research Method for Designing
ISSRM-compliant Languages
As the basic principles of Security Risk Management have been explained, we now describe the
research method developed to address the question: what are the concepts that should be present in
a modelling language supporting ISSRM during the early stages of IS development? The research
method as described in [MHM07] consists of four steps. An overview is given in Fig. 4.1. It follows
an iterative and incremental development pattern: during the work's progress, previous steps are
frequently revisited to improve results of initial steps that are themselves used as inputs for further
steps.
In order to provide stable and solid foundations for language support, a structured response
to the previously enunciated question is formulated. A systematic analysis of ISSRM sources will
produce the extraction of relevant concepts. Proceeding this way, concepts from existing security-
oriented languages will be confronted with these extracted concepts and the coverage between
them will be established. The resulting overlap will used in step 4. The research method gives a
detailed description of this systematic analysis is described below and refers to Fig. 4.1.
4.1 Step 1: Concept Alignment
The first step is to collect information about the state of the art in ISSRM. The main objective
of this step is the identification of key domain components and harmonization in terminology used
in ISSRM sources.
Covered sources belong to one of these four categories: a) RM standards, b) security-related
standards, c) security RM methods and d) Software Engineering (SE) security frameworks. We
elicit and detail them in Chapter 5.
Two documents are produced as outcome of this step (a detailed presentation of these docu-
ments will be given in the sequel):
• a grid that highlights the semantic similarities between terms as described in ISSRM sources;
• a glossary composed of definitions extracted from source documents.
Reading and extracting relevant information from source documents is the first part of the
job made in this step, does not require a special manner to proceed. The second part, the
harmonization of terminologies, could eventually be made following a quite formal method as
UEML [A.L07, AG07]. Such quite formal methods have been used in [MPL07, MPL06]. Potential
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Survey of literature:
- Risk management standards
- Security-related standards
- Security risk management methods
- SE security frameworks
ISSRM domain model
Security-oriented languages
Meta-model Glossary
ISSRM concept alignment
Step 1:
Concept alignment 
Step 3: Comparison between 
ISSRM domain model and 
security-oriented languages
ISSRM extended languages
Step 2:
Construction of ISSRM 
domain model
Step 4: ISSRM 
language definition
Figure 4.1: Global research method (adapted from [MHM07])
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inputs are source documents, which are written in natural language. Such documents are not pre-
cisely defined, they can be understood differently by different people. So we need driven methods
to analyse these documents. Moreover, the nature of these source documents raises problem. In-
deed, they are scientific papers that might lack some concrete details about the provided content.
The last and not the least, some concepts are described using different terminologies.
4.2 Step 2: Construction of ISSRM Domain Model
Using the grid as input, as a summary of key concepts used mainly in ISSRM sources, and
the glossary as the semantic basis for key concepts, step 2 consists in the creation of a conceptual
model of the ISSRM domain as a UML class diagram. This conceptual model is the foundation
for the following step. Indeed, any RE security modelling language has to be designed to fit the
conceptual domain model. The model is complemented with key components definitions glossary.
These definitions are obtained by reusing, if needed improving, definitions discovered in source
documents during step 1.
In order to produce a UML class diagram, the key concepts' elicitation process is reused to ex-
tract relevant relationships between these concepts. A new glossary [MHM07] is created in which
relevant source documents excerpts are gathered in a way to prove the relationships' existence.
The new model follows the UML class diagram syntax. The choice of those which are, among
key concepts obtained in step 1, relevant enough in the context of the new model being constructed,
is made using common sense.
4.3 Step 3: Comparison between ISSRM Domain Model and
Security-oriented Languages
Is it necessary to reinvent the wheel? This is one of the most relevant questions that any-
body should ask himself before trying to build something new. The metaphor is suitable in the
ISSRM domain context. This is why several security modelling languages as KAOS extended to
security [vL04], Abuse frames [LNI+03a], Misuse cases [LBD02], Abuse cases [MF99] and secure
TROPOS [MJF06] are considered. Most of these languages are security extensions to existing
modelling languages. For example, Misuse cases and Abuses cases are based on regular Use
cases. The process unfolds like this: security modelling languages metamodels are investigated,
looking for concepts in the ISSRM domain model which are supported and those which are miss-
ing. To help determining if a concept is present or not in the studied language, a UML class
diagram is created. The class diagram contains key concepts that are supported by the language
and relationships between them. At the end of this process, the class diagrams can be used to
compare potential candidate languages for ISSRM modelling.
We use two methods to align concepts of security modelling languages with those of ISSRM
domain model. The initial method was based on the definition of the different concepts and
the metamodel of the languages in order to find synonyms in the ISSRM domain model. We
used it to align security modelling languages such as KeS, Misuse cases, Abuse cases and Abuse
frames (these languages are detailed in Chapter 7). However, it appeared that the precision of
the outcomes of this alignment method was insufficient. One can find, in Appendix 3, the method
and its outcomes. We then refined the method in order that it produces more accurate results.
We described and used this method in Chapter 9.
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4.4 Step 4: ISSRM Language Definition
Providing languages to support the ISSRM can be seen as the ultimate result of our research
method. However, the introduction of a new language in the habits of an organisation which works
with another language (or a combination of them or not at all) is a risky process. To ensure a
smooth transition with respect to current organisational practices, the ISSRM domain model can
be used as a framework outlining key concepts that should be taken into account when security
concerns are tackled. So step 4 could result in ISSRM compliant versions of existing security
modelling languages. Another aspect processed in Step 4 is the formal definition of syntax and
semantic [HR04] of the ISSRM languages in order to support automated reasoning and avoid
ambiguity. Softer characteristics as the appropriateness of graphical constructs and structuring
mechanisms will also be taken into account [Moo06a, Moo06b].
Our contribution takes place at steps 2 and 3. In step 2, we elicited the ISSRM relationships
(see Chapter 8) and, in step 3, we aligned several security modelling languages (described in
Chapter 7 and discussed in Chapter 9).
4.5 Summary
In order to fulfill the objectives of this thesis, we performed parts of the research method that
we detailed in this chapter. The research method can be decomposed into four successive steps.
The performed parts belong to the step 2  to achieve the first objective  and step 3  to complete
the other. The step 1 consists of the survey of security and risk related sources. The next chapter
presents a state of the art of this literature.
Chapter5
Analysis of Security and Risk related
Sources
This chapter introduces the security and risk related sources that were used to elicit the relevant
concepts that compose the ISSRM domain model. We begin by a state of the art of these sources.
Then we present the documents produced as outcomes of the elicitation of the relevant concepts.
5.1 State of the Art of the Security and Risk related Sources
The research method, described in Chapter 4, begins with a literature survey, investigating
four families of security and risk related sources. A description of each family and elements that
constitute it is given, to present the literature covered by this research. Explanations about the
four families are extracted from [MHM07] with some added information and presented in Table 5.1.
Family of sources
1. Risk Management standards
ISO/IEC Guide 73 [ISO02]
AS/NZS 4360 [AS/04]
2. IS/IT security standards
ISO/IEC 27001 [ISO05]
ISO/IEC 13335-1 [ISO04]
Common Criteria [Com05]
NIST 800-27 Rev A / NIST 800-30 [SHF04]
3. Risk Management methods
EBIOS [DCS04]
MEHARI [CLU04]
OCTAVE [ADA01]
CRAMM [Con03]
CORAS [VML+07]
4. Software engineering security
frameworks
Haley et al. [HMLN06]
Firesmith [Fir03]
Table 5.1: Four categories of security and risk related sources
5.1.1 Risk Management Standards
This first family gathers high-level references presenting general RM.
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• ISO/IEC Guide 73 [ISO02]: this guide defines the RM vocabulary and guidelines for use
in ISO standards. It mainly focuses on terminology, which is of great interest with respect
to our research method;
• AS/NZS 4360 [AS/04]: this joint Australian/New-Zealand standard provides a generic
guide for RM. The document proposes an overview of RM terminology and process.
5.1.2 (IS/IT) Security Standards
This category of documents often contains a section that concerns security-specific terminology.
Sometimes some RM concepts are also mentioned.
• ISO/IEC 27001 [ISO05]: the objective of this standard is to provide a model for es-
tablishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving an
Information Security Management System (ISMS), that is the part of the overall manage-
ment system of an organisation concerned by information security. The terminology related
to an ISMS is provided in this reference;
• ISO/IEC 13335-1 [ISO04]: this standard is the first of the ISO/IEC 13335 guidelines series
that deals with the planning, management and implementation of IT security. This part is
about concepts and models of IT security that may be applicable to different organisations;
• Common Criteria [Com05]: the Common Criteria (or ISO/IEC 15408) provides a common
set of requirements for the security functions of IT products and systems and for assurance
measures applied to them during a security evaluation. The first part entitled Introduction
and general model is important with respect to our research scope;
• NIST 800-27 Rev A [SHF04] / NIST 800-30 [7] [SGF02]: within the series of publica-
tions proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the 800-series
is about computer security. In this series of publications, NIST 800-27 and NIST 800-30 are
the most relevant to the scope proposed this thesis. Terminology and concepts are provided
by these standards and are compliant with each other.
5.1.3 Risk Management Methods
In 2004, a CLUSIF1 study registered more than 200 security RM methods. In this work, only
a representative subset of RM methods based on some recent conferences and studies, like the
report Inventory of risk assessment and risk management methods [17] from ENISA have been
retained. Most of the methods are supported by a software tool, but the focus in our research
method stays only on the methodological part of each of them. As industry often works with
ready-to-use products, these RM methods are well widespread in this environment and will be
more retailed.
• EBIOS [DCS04]: the EBIOS method is developed and maintained by the DCSSI (Central
Information Systems Security Division) in France. It was created in 1995, it is composed
by five guidebooks (introduction, steps, risk assessment tools, risk treatment tools) and is
supported by a software. The method aims to formalize security objectives suitable to (1)
security needs revealed by audits and (2) the context of the organisation in which secu-
rity objectives will be established. EBIOS decomposes the risk management into the three
blocks previously described. As you can see on Fig. 5.1, the risk is constructed by taking into
account the IS environment, its borders, the essential elements, information corresponding
to business assets and, finally, entities which are IS assets. The second step of the EBIOS
method follows a grid gathering the desired security criteria: confidentiality, integrity and
availability. The risk tuned to the organisation is reinforced by taking into account vulner-
abilities and threats judged as critical. Combining these two first steps, high-level security
1Club de la Sécurité de l'Information Français http://www.clusif.asso.fr/en/clusif/present/
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requirements are defined, directly followed by low-level requirements named requirements.
The last step leads to select right countermeasures suitable to organisation needs.
Due to the fact that EBIOS process does not treat the controls selection and controls im-
plementation, EBIOS is considered only as a risk analysis method.
Context study
Threats studySecurity needs
elicitation
Security needs
identification
Security requirements
elicitation
Figure 5.1: Global EBIOS process (adapted from [MH06])
• MEHARI [CLU04]: MEHARI is a RM methodology developed by the CLUSIF and built on
the top of two other RM methods: MARION [CLU98] and MELISA [Dir89] not maintained
anymore. MEHARI remains one of the most used risk management methods. MEHARI can
be viewed as a completed IS security toolbox, presented as a set of modules.
The figure Fig. 5.2 displays a graphical of MEHARI process.
• OCTAVE [ADA01]: OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability
Evaluation) is an approach to information security risk evaluations developed by SEI at the
Carnegie Mellon University. The basis of this method is the capacity to realise internal
audits. OCTAVE is suitable for large organisation. That is why OCTAVE-S has been
proposed: to address risks in small structures. The two methods evaluate vulnerabilities
and threats on operational assets. The OCTAVE (and OCTAVE-S) process is decomposed
into three steps and represented in Fig. 5.3:
1. step 1 (organisational view): identification of relevant IT resources, their threats and
the associated security requirements;
2. step 2 (technical view): identification of infrastructure vulnerabilities;
3. step 3 (protection and risk reduction design): security strategy development and its
planning.
As EBIOS, OCTAVE can be considered only as a risk analysis method.
• CRAMM [Con03]: CRAMM is a RM method from the UK originally developed by CCTA3
in 1985 and currently maintained by Insight Consulting.
• CORAS [VML+07]: CORAS (Risk Assessment of Security Critical Systems) was a Euro-
pean project developing a tool-supported framework, exploiting methods for risk analysis
and risk assessment of security critical systems. Theses modules permit:
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action planning based
on audits
action planning based
on risks analysis
projects risks
management
action planning based
on stakes analysis
stakes analysis
classification
audits of security services
elicitation and selection
of risk situations
analysis of risk situations
Figure 5.2: MEHARI process (adapted from [MH06])
Step 1:
organisational view
Step 2:
technical view
Step 3:
strategy development
Preparation
Figure 5.3: Main steps of OCTAVE process (adapted from [MH06])
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 to analyse security stakes by describing kinds of dysfunctions and to classify assets
depending on three security criteria (availability, integrity, confidentiality);
 to make audits on security services, testing their efficiency, their controls and to sum-
marize vulnerabilities;
 to analyse risk circumstances (leading to evaluate their potentiality and their impacts)
and risk attenuation factors, for, ultimately, assess risk level.
5.1.4 SE Security Frameworks
The publications in which Software Engineering security frameworks are depicted, are ex-
tracted from SE and RE domain which are of great interest regarding the research scope. Those
publications concern safety and security.
• Haley et al. [HMLN06]: this framework deals with security in RE;
• Firesmith [Fir03]: this framework is a set of related information models that provide a
theoretical foundation underlying safety, security, and survivability engineering.
5.2 Grid of Concepts
To achieve the comparison of relevant concepts of the surveyed sources and to choose those
which are necessary to construct ISSRM domain model, it is obviously important to have a clear
view of supported concepts for each of these sources. A matrix was found to be an handy repre-
sentation for this data. We present in Fig. 5.4 a excerpt of the complete grid of concepts.
RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARD
Type Concept ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002 AS/NZS 4360:2004
Concepts related to assets
  Asset / /
  Business asset / /
  IS asset / /
  Security goal Risk criteria Risk criteria
Concepts related to risk
  Risk Risk Risk
  Threat agent / /
  Attack method / /
  Threat Source Source of risk (or hazard)
  Vulnerability / Cause
/ /
  Cause of the risk Event Event
  Impact Consequence Consequence (or loss)
  High-level secu. req. Risk treatment measure Risk treatment measure
  Security requirement / /
  Control Risk control Control
  Attack method +          
 Vulnerability
Concepts related to risk 
treatment
Figure 5.4: Excerpt of the grid of concepts
The grid is presented as a matrix in two dimensions. The first contains the name of the studied
ISSRM sources, classified according to the family they belong to. The second suggests a label for
the relevant concepts. The suggestion takes into account labels proposed in the security and risk
related sources and the analysis performed in step 1 (Note that the excerpt of the grid only presents
a small part of the complete grid. That is why the name of some concepts, such as security goal
and impact, do not seems to the corresponding terms in the excerpt of the grid). The content
of the grid is the outcome of the step 1. The concepts are grouped into three blocks. The first
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is composed of the concepts that are related to the notion of asset. The second group gathers
concepts that composed the notion of risk. The last group concerns the risk treatment related
concepts. At present, fourteen concepts have been selected which are defined in Chapter 6. They
are gathered in the column named Concept. The complete grid can be found in Appendix 1.
5.3 Glossary of Key Concepts
While building the grid, a glossary of key concepts has to be elaborated to capture concept
definitions extracted from ISSRM sources. The aim of the glossary is to condense in an unique
document all the excerpts related to definitions on which step 2 is based. A difficulty is that a
concept definition is often scattered in several parts of the document. Using a glossary centralizing
the information facilitates the maintenance and navigation. We give an overview of the content of
the glossary of concepts definitions in Fig. 5.5. This excerpt presents how EBIOS v2 described its
fundamental terms. Note that all security and risk related sources do not give such definition for
their concepts. As discussed previously, definition are sometimes scattered in several parts of the
document. In this case, relevant sentences are gathered in the glossary and key terms are empha-
sized. One can see an example of this situation in the part of the glossary related to MEHARI.
The full glossary can be found in [MHM07].
EBIOS v.2
Asset: Any resource of value to the organisation and necessary for achieving its objectives. There is
an important distinction between essential elements and entities needing to be protected. Examples: -
list of names; - certification request; - invoice management; - encryption algorithm; - laptop
computer; - Ethernet; - operating system; - etc.
Attack: Exploiting one or more vulnerabilities using an attack method with a given opportunity.
Examples: - strong opportunity of using counterfeit or copied software resulting from total absence of
awareness or information concerning copyright legislation; - software damaged by a virus through
easy loading of malicious programmes onto the organisation's office network; - etc.
Attack method: Standard means (action or event) by which a threat agent carries out an attack.
Examples: - theft of media or documents; - software entrapment; - attack on availability of personnel;
- passive wiretapping; - flood; - …
Entity: An asset such as an organisation, site, personnel, equipment, network, software, system.
Examples: - facilities management company; - the organisation's premises; - system administrator; -
laptop computer; - Ethernet; - operating system; - teleprocedure gateway; - …
Essential element: Information or function with at least one non-nil sensitivity. Examples: - list of
names; - certification request; - invoice management; - encryption algorithm; - etc.
Impact: Consequences for an organisation when a threat is accomplished. Examples: - loss of
customers' confidence in a trade mark; - financial loss of 10% of turnover; - infringement of laws and
regulations leading to legal proceedings against the Director; - etc.
Figure 5.5: Excerpt of the glossary of concepts definitions
This unique glossary gathers information about all sources of the four families and it is divided
into several sections. Each section corresponds to one the sources. In each section, concepts and
their related definitions are classified in alphabetical order. When the definition of a concept
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contained in several sentences, keywords of the definition are written in bold font. Thus, under-
standing a concept is quite easier, just by looking for the right definition or for set of sentences
and the words that are in bold font.
5.4 Summary
We started this chapter by a state of the art of security and risk related sources. This literature
can be grouped into four categories: Risk Management standards, IS/IT security standards, Risk
Management methods and Software engineering security frameworks. We briefly discussed the
grid of concepts and the glossary that gathers concepts definitions of each source. Using these
outcomes and relationships that we extracted  detailed in Chapter 8 , the ISSRM domain was
elaborated. We introduce it in the next chapter.

Chapter6
ISSRM Domain Model
Based on relevant concepts obtained at the end of the step 2 of the research method, it is
possible to design the ISSRM domain model. The ISSRM domain model is depicted in Fig. 6.1.
As one can see, it can be decomposed into three groups of concepts:
• a) assets-related concepts: this block of concepts describe what are relevant assets of the
system-to-be to protect. It also presents the criteria that guarantee the assets security. It
gathers concepts that have a beige background colour;
• b) risk-related concepts: it presents how the risk itself is defined and what are principles
that should be taken into account when eliciting potential risks. The background colour of
these concepts is the orange;
• c) risk-treatment decision: it describes decisions, requirements and controls that should
be chosen and implemented in order to mitigate risks. These concepts are painted in green.
In [MHM06], one can find explanations related to the selection of these concepts and the way their
label were chosen.
6.1 Definition of ISSRM Domain Model Concepts
We give a definition for each concept of the ISSRM domain model. Concepts are gathered
following the block they belong to as we explained before.
6.1.1 Asset-related Concepts
Asset: anything that has value to the organisation and necessary for achieving its objectives.
Examples: list of names; medical reimbursement process; operating system; laptop computer; Eth-
ernet network; people encoding data; system administrator; air conditioning of server room.
Business asset: information or process inherent to the business of the organisation that has
value to the organisation and necessary for achieving its objectives.
Examples: list of names; medical reimbursement process.
IS asset: a component or part of the IS that has value to the organisation and necessary for
achieving its objectives and supporting business assets. An IS asset can be a component of the
IT system, like hardware, software or network but also people or facilities playing a role in the IS
and so in its security. Sometimes it is relevant for conducting a macroscopic analysis to define a
system as an IS asset, composed of various IS assets belonging to other types described above.
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Figure 6.1: ISSRM domain model
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Examples: operating system; laptop computer; Ethernet network; people encoding data; system
administrator; air conditioning of server room.
Security criterion:  also called security properties  security criteria are properties or con-
straints on business assets characterising their security needs. Security criteria act as an indicator
to assess significance of risk. Security criteria are most often confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability, but sometimes, depending on the context, some other specific criteria might be added,
like authenticity, non-repudiation or accountability. Security goals of an IS are defined by using
security criteria on business assets.
Examples: confidentiality of information X; integrity of process Y.
6.1.2 Risk-related Concepts
Risk: a security risk is the combination of a threat with one or more vulnerabilities leading to
a negative impact harming one or more of the assets. Threat and vulnerabilities are part of the
cause of the risk and impact is the consequence of the risk.
Examples: a cracker using social engineering on a member of the organisation, because of weak
awareness of the staff, leading to non-authorised access on personal computers and loss of con-
fidentiality and integrity of sensitive information; a thief penetrating the organisation's building
because of lack of physical access control, stealing documents containing sensitive information and
so provoking loss of confidentiality.
Cause of the risk: the cause of a risk is the combination of a threat and one or more vulnera-
bilities.
Examples: Cracker using social engineering because of lack of awareness; a thief penetrating the
organisation's building because of lack of physical access control.
Threat: potential attack or incident which, in combination with one or more vulnerabilities,
targets one or more of the IS assets and that may lead to harm to assets. A threat is usually
composed of a threat agent and an attack method. Note: We advocate that sometimes, a risk is
more relevant to be described with a global threat, without refining into threat agent and attack
method, like for a flood or a component failure.
Examples: Cracker using social engineering, flood, component failure.
Threat agent: a threat agent is an agent that can potentially cause harm to assets of the IS.
A threat agent triggers a threat and is thus at the source of a risk. It can be characterised by
its type (usually human or natural/environmental) and by the way in which it acts (accidental
or deliberate). In the case of an accidental cause, it could also be characterised by exposure and
available resources and in the case of a deliberate cause, it could also be characterised by expertise,
available resources and motivation.
Examples: member of the personnel with little technical ability and time but possibly a strong
motivation to carry out an attack; cracker with considerable technical ability, well equipped and
strongly motivated by the money he could make; very wet climate for three months of the year;
virus.
Attack method: standard means by which a threat agent carries out a threat.
Examples: system intrusion; theft of media or documents; social engineering; component failure;
flood.
Vulnerability: characteristic of an IS asset or group of IS assets that can constitute a weakness
or a flaw in terms of IS security. It could be accidentally or intentionally exploited by a threat.
Examples: weak awareness; lack of access control; lack of fire detection.
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Impact: the impact is the potential negative consequence of a risk that may harm assets of a
system or an organisation, when a threat (or the cause of a risk) is accomplished. The impact can
be described at the level of IS asset (data destruction, failure of a component) or at the level of
business assets, where it negates security criteria, like for example: loss of confidentiality, loss of
integrity, unavailability. Impact can provoke chain reaction of impacts (or indirect impact), like
for example a loss of confidentiality on sensitive information leads to a loss of customer confidence.
Examples: Password discovery (IS level); loss of confidentiality (business level).
6.1.3 Risk Treatment-related Concepts
Risk treatment decision: expression of the intention to treat identified risks. It satisfies a
security need, expressed in generic and functional terms which can be refined through security
requirements. Risk treatment decisions can include:
• avoiding risk (risk avoidance decision): decision not to be involved in, or to withdraw from
a risk;
• reducing risk (risk reduction decision): to take action to lessen the probability, negative
consequences, or both, associated with a risk;
• transferring risk (risk transfer decision): sharing with another party the burden of loss for a
risk;
• retaining risk (risk retention decision): accepting the burden of loss from a risk.
Examples: not to allow to reach the service outside of the internal network ; the rooms must
be protected against lightning ; to take insurance for covering the loss of service; accept that the
service could be unavailable for 1 hour.
Security requirement: the security requirements are the refinement of the risk treatment deci-
sion into a set of security requirements to mitigate the risk. Each security requirement contributes
to cover one or more risk treatment decision for the target IS. Note: Most often, security require-
ments are used to refine risk reduction decisions.
Examples: the system must generate the encryption keys in compliance with a specified encryption
key generation algorithm and with the specified sizes of encryption keys in compliance with specified
standards; a physical access control must be performed; rooms must be protected against the start
and spread of fire.
Control: a control is designed to improve security, specified by a security requirement and
implemented to comply with it. Security controls can be processes, policies, devices, practices or
other actions or components of the IS and its organisation that act to reduce risk. Synonyms are
countermeasures or safeguards.
Examples: firewall; backup procedure; building guard.
6.2 Relationships and Multiplicities
We now present the relationships and their multiplicities that are defined between ISSRM
domain model concepts (depicted in Fig. 6.1). We make our discussion following the three same
groups as we did for concepts definition.
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6.2.1 Asset-related Relationships and Multiplicities
Assets can be specialised in two different sub-concepts: Business assets and IS assets. This
specification is disjoint and complete. An IS asset can support one or more Business assets, but a
Business asset can have no support in the IS. On the other hand, a Business asset can be supported
by several IS assets. A Vulnerability is a characteristic of an IS asset or a group of IS assets. An
IS asset can have from zero to several Vulnerabilities. A Threat targets one or more IS assets and
an IS asset can be targeted by several Threats. The term can means that IS assets might not be
threatened at all. Business assets can  absence is envisaged in the case where the Business asset
has no support in the IS  be constrained by Security criteria. A Security criterion can constrain
several different Business assets. Impacts harm Assets, at the levels of Business and IS assets. An
Asset can be harmed by zero (if no impact is considered as relevant) or several impacts and an
impacts harms at least an IS asset and a Business asset, but more than two are often harmed by
an impact. At the level of Business assets, an Impact negates one or more Security criteria and
a security criterion can be negated by zero (if no relevant impact is concerned by this Security
criterion) or several impacts. One or several Security criteria can be taken into account to assess
the significance of a risk. But a Security criterion can be concerned by none of the risks if there
is no relevant Impact for the criterion.
6.2.2 Risk-related Relationships and Multiplicities
A Risk is composed of a Cause and one or more Impacts. A specific Impact can be the related
to several Risks. A given Cause leads to, at least, one or several Impacts. An Impact can results
from several Causes. Sometimes a relevant Impact can be caused by no relevant Causes of the
risk and thus contained in none of the Risks. To illustrate this situation, we take the example
of an organisation that wants to avoid the disclosure of user personal information. But as the
organisation gathers no data about users, no realistic Cause of the risk can lead to this relevant
Impact. Impacts can provoke some other (indirect) Impacts. For instance, an Impact at the
IS level of unauthorized access to a database provokes confidential information disclosure at the
business level, leading to the loss of customer confidence and judicial penalties. The Cause of a
risk is composed of a Threat and one or more Vulnerabilities. A given Threat can only be related
to a specific Cause of the risk. The Threat exploits one or more Vulnerabilities. A Vulnerability
can be exploited by many different Threats and therefore related to many different Causes of the
risk, or not be exploited by any of them, if no relevant cause is found. A Threat is defined in terms
of a Threat agent who uses an Attack method. Each Threat agent and Attack method identified
as relevant can be involved in several Threats or sometimes in none of them, if no important
corresponding (respectively) Attack method/Threat agent is found. A given Threat agent can use
from zero to several Attack methods and an Attack method can be used by zero or more Threat
agents.
6.2.3 Risk Treatment-related Relationships and Multiplicities
A Risk treatment decision expresses the intention to treat one or more Risks. We state that
each Risk has a corresponding Risk treatment decision, even if the decision is to accept the risk.
Risk treatment decisions are generally refined into one or more Security requirements. Note that
the Risk treatment decision of acceptance or avoidance does not produce Security requirements.
Each Security requirement refines one Risk treatment decision. A Security requirement mitigates
one or more Risks and a Risk might not be mitigated by any Security requirement if the Risk
is accepted for example. It can also be mitigated by several Security requirements if they are
necessary to reach an acceptable level of Risk. Finally, a Control implements one or more Security
requirements and a Security requirement can be implemented by more than one Control.
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6.3 Summary
The IS Security Risk Management (ISSRM) domain model defines all revelant concepts to
elaborate secure system, from the analysis of a existing system to the introduction of counter-
measures to potential risks. The concepts of the ISSRM domain model can be grouped into three
blocks: the asset block, the risk block and the risk treatment blocks. We defined relationships
existing between the concepts and their multiplicities. We now introduce the security modelling
languages that we will align with ISSRM domain model in Chapter 9.
Chapter7
Security Modelling Languages
In this chapter, we introduces security modelling languages that we will use to perform step
3 of the research method (see Chapter 4). We provide a detailed description of KeS and secure
TROPOS as they are analysed in this thesis. Other security modelling languages  Misuse cases,
Abuse cases and Abuse frames  are briefly presented. Their analysis can be found in Appendix
3.
7.1 KAOS
The first security modelling language that we introduce isKnowledgeAcquisition in autOmated
Specification (KAOS). This language in itself has no security concerns but as we will describe be-
low, it has been extended to security and it is then called KAOS extend to Security (KeS). Note
that name of KeS has been chosen by ourselves.
7.1.1 Introduction to KAOS
We base our introduction to KAOS on [MMHD07]. The definition of KAOS can be found
in [vL03, Let01]. KAOS is a goal-oriented modelling language. Its main purpose it to identify root
goals  high level goals  and to refine them until achieving precise requirements. Agents are then
elicited and they are designated as responsible of the requirements. The successive refinements of
goals until requirements modelled alternative solutions of the system-to-be that will be discussed
in order to select the most satisfactory solution.
The KAOS approach consists of a modelling language, a method, and a software environment.
We focus on the modelling language. A KAOS model consists of four types of diagrams (also
called models in KAOS):
1. the goal model: identifies the root goals of the system-to-be and their refinements until
obtaining requirements that are assigned to agents;
2. the object model: identifies the objects of the system-to-be that are used during opera-
tionalization. The object model is generally built in parallel with the goal model;
3. the operation model: identifies the operations required to fulfill a requirement elicited in
the goal model. Operations have inputs and outputs and are performed by agents;
4. the agent models: identifies the agents of the system-to-be.
In the sequel of the thesis, we will mainly focus on the goal and the object models.
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A KAOS metamodel is depicted in Fig. 7.1. We do not describe the metamodel in detail but
we explain its main concepts.
• Goal: a Goal is a prescriptive assertion that captures an objective that the system-to-be
should meet [MMHD07]. It can be categorized as one of these four patterns: maintain,
cease, achieve and avoid (see Fig. 7.1). Each pattern defines a temporal behaviour cate-
gories [Let01];
• G-refinement: a Goal can be refined using a G-refinement which decompose the Goal into
a set of sub-goals. This decomposition is an AND decomposition. Sub-goals, with possibly
domain properties, contribute to the satisfaction of the decomposed Goal. The possible
alternatives in the design of the system-to-be can be expressed by modelling alternative
G-refinement for the same Goal;
• Object: an Object is a (kind of) thing of interest in the system [MMHD07]. Instances of
an Object are recognizable and they can evolve from state to state.
• Attribute: Objects have Attributes that characterize the states of the system-to-be. Hence,
a Goal refers to Objects and/or their Attributes [vL03];
• Agent: an Agent plays a role towards the satisfaction of a Goal by controlling the behaviour
of the Objects concerned by this Goal;
• Requirement: a Goal refined until it is possible to find a software Agent who is responsible
for it is called a Requirement. Requirements can be operationalized in the Operations model;
• Expectation: an Expectation is a terminal refinement of a Goal and it is assigned to an
Agent of the environment, whereas a Requirement is assigned to a Software Agent;
• Operation: an Operation is an input-output relationship over Objects; Operations are
determined textually by domain (DomPre and DomPost) and required (RegPre, ReqTrig
and ReqPost) conditions;
• Domain property: a Domain property is a property that naturally holds in the environ-
ment.
The syntax of KAOS and KeS  as we will see in the sequel  is depicted in Fig. 7.2. Goal G1
refined with the G-refinement into sub-goal 1A and sub-goal 1B is an AND G-refinement. The
Goal G2 is refined with two alternative G-refinements into sub-goal 1 and sub-goal 2.
7.1.2 Introduction to KeS
KeS is introduced in [vL04] and deals with security concerns by using security Goals that have
a concern relationship with assets. The metamodel of KeS is exactly the same as the one depicted
in Fig. 7.1. The only difference is the point of view of the analyst when eliciting the Goals from
the malicious Agent. Thus, instead of having a Goal model, an Object model, an Agent model and
a Operation model, these models are prefixed by the term Anti-. New concepts (but represented
with the same metamodel as KAOS) are:
• Asset: Assets of the system-to-be are modelled as Objects and are constrained by security
criteria. These security criteria need to be protected against threats. Security criteria are
represented as Objects attributes concerned by Anti-goal (Anti-goal is defined below);
• Threat: a Threat is a attacker's Goal also called Anti-goal;
• Attacker: an Attacker is represented as a malicious Agent in the environment.
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Figure 7.1: KAOS metamodel (adapted from [MMHD07])
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Figure 7.2: Graphical representation of KAOS and KeS concepts
The Anti-goal model is used to capture all possible Attackers, their Goals, the software Vulner-
abilities and the Attack methods of the Attackers. When this Anti-goal model has been built, the
analyst of the system-to-be has to consider countermeasures to the found Anti-goals and Vulnera-
bilities. As described in [MMHD07], countermeasures might include security treatment decisions,
such as goal substitution, agent substitution, goal weakening, goal restoration, anti-goal mitiga-
tion, anti-goal prevention, vulnerability protection and vulnerability avoidance. Once the suitable
decision taken in order to counter a specific threat, new security Goals are integrated in the latter
models. As you can see, the KeS method is a iterative process as each time countermeasures are
introduced in the design of the system-to-be, a new phase of assessment of the potential threat
introduced by these new countermeasures has to be completed.
7.1.3 Illustration of KAOS and KeS in the Banking Services Example
To illustrate concepts of KAOS and KeS, we present the Banking Service example. Our aim is
not to develop a complete case study at this point of the thesis. One can be found in Chapter 10,
where we describe the Meeting scheduler system. The considered example is based on [vL04].
We depict in Fig. 7.3 an excerpt of the goal model of the Banking Services example. We
start with the Goal MoneyTakenFromTheBank that is refined into a Domain property There-
IsSomeMoneyInAccount, a Requirement Achieve [MoneyTakenOnlyByBankCustomer] under the
responsibility of the Agent BankCustomer. The last element of the refinement is the Goal Avoid
[MoneyStolenFromBankAccounts]. As the labels of these concepts are self-explanatory, we do not
explain them in further details. The Goal Avoid [MoneyStolenFromBankAccounts] itself can be
refined into two alternative sub-goals Avoid [PaymentMediumKnownByThief] and Avoid [Money-
TakenFromAttackedAccounts]. We focus on the fulfillment of the Goal Avoid [PaymentMedium-
KnownByThief] that we decompose into three Requirements Avoid [ThiefKnowsWhichBank],
Avoid [ThiefKnowsAccountStructure] and Avoid [AccountNumberAndPinKnownByThief]. We
choose, for sake of shortness, not to refine the Goal Avoid [MoneyTakenFromAttackedAccounts].
On the Operation model of the Requirement Achieve [MoneyTakenOnlyByBankCustomer]
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Figure 7.3: Excerpt of the Goal model of the Banking Services (adapted from [MMHD07])
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(depicted in Fig. 7.4), this Requirement is placed under the responsibility of the Agent Bank-
Customer and it is operationalized into three Operations: EnterPin, TakeMoney and Enter-
AccountNumber. The latter Operation uses the DatabaseAccountNumbers to perform its internal
process.
Figure 7.4: Operation model of the operationalization of the Requirement Achieve [MoneyTaken-
OnlyByBankCustomer] (adapted from [MMHD07])
Once the system-to-be is modelled, we can investigate the attacker's point of view (see Fig. 7.5).
This is done by building the anti-goal model that negates one of the Goals of the goal model. The
negated Goal is transformed into the Anti-goal Achieve [AccountNumberAndPinKnownByThief].
It is refined into two alternative sub-goals Achieve [PinKnownAndMatchingAccountFound] and
Achieve [AccountKnownAndMatchingPinFound]. The second alternative is not further refined.
The first leads by successive refinements to three Requirements Achieve [PinKnown], Achieve
[AccountCheckedForPinMatch] and Achieve [CheckIteratedOnOtherAccountsIfNoMatch].
These three Requirements are assigned to the Agent called Attacker.
The attack method of the attacker is described in Fig. 7.6. The Requirement Achieve [Check-
IteratedOnOtherAccountsIfNoMatch] is operationalized into two Operations InputNextAccount-
Number and CheckIfAccountNumberMatch. The second Operation needs the DatabaseOfAccount-
Numbers as inputs and outputs of its internal process.
7.2 Secure TROPOS
The second security modelling language that we analyse in the next chapter is secure TROPOS.
7.2.1 Introduction to TROPOS
TROPOS, whose name is derived from two Greek words meaning respectively way of doing
things and turn or change, is a software development method founded on concepts of actor
(which can be agents, positions or roles), goal, plan (also called task), resource, capability, belief
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Figure 7.5: Anti-goal model of an attacker against the Banking Services (adapted from [MMHD07])
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Figure 7.6: Operationalization of the Attacker's Requirement Achieve [CheckIteratedOnOther-
AccountsIfNoMatch] (adapted from [MMHD07])
and dependency. These concepts, that are used to model requirements, have been introduced in
i∗ proposed by Eric Yu in [Yu95b]. However, the TROPOS methodology is intended to cover all
analysis and design activities in the software development process, from early requirements down
to the solution implementation. The main idea is to build a model of the system-to-be [BGG+04]
and its environments and to improve it incrementally by refinements and extensions. Hence, TRO-
POS provides a common interface to software development activities and a basis for evolution and
documentation of the solution.
More precisely, the TROPOS methodology manipulates i∗ concepts that we define just below.
In TROPOS, several types of models are created but, as we focus on early requirements, we
take into account only a) the Strategic Dependency Model and b) the Strategic Rationale
Model.
The Strategic Dependency Model (SDM) is used to describe the network of relationships
between actors of the system-to-be. These relationships capture the intentional dependencies
between actors, and not the actors' internal goals. The concepts involved in this model are:
• actor: entity that has strategic goal and intentionality within the system or the organisation
setting. An actor represents a physical, a social or a software agent as well as a role or
position [BGG+04]. A role is defined as the behaviour of an actor in a given context. A
position gathers a set of roles generally played by a specific agent. Following TROPOS
definition, we say that an agent occupies a position and that a position covers a role;
• goal: represents one of the actors' strategic interests that is clearly defined, clearly bounded;
When it is fulfilled, a goal is said to be satisfied;
• softgoal: represents one of the actors' strategic interests that that has no clear-cut definition
and/or criteria for deciding whether it is satisfied or not [BGG+04]. When it is achieved,
a softgoal is said to be satisficed. This distinction of terminology with the fulfillment of a
goal permits to distinguish between the goals and the softgoals;
• plan: also called task represents a way of doing things at a relatively abstract level;
• resource: represents an informational or physical entity;
• capability: is the term denoting the ability of an actor of defining, choosing and executing a
task for the fulfillment of a goal, given certain world conditions and in presence of a specific
event [BGG+04]. The elicitation of actors' capabilities is done at the end of the TROPOS
process (described in the sequel of the thesis);
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• belief : is the actor's knowledge of the world [BGG+04];
• dependency: a dependency between two actors indicates that one actor (the dependee)
depends for some reason on another one (the depender) in order to achieve a goal, to execute
a plan, to deliver a resource. The object of the dependency is called the dependum. A
dependum can be a goal, a softgoal, a plan or a resource.
Fig. 7.7 depicts the graphical syntax of the TROPOS concepts used in SDM. Fig. 7.8 presents
an example of SDM where an actor  the Patient  depends on another actor  the eSAP system
(a detail explanation of eSAP system is given in the sequel)  to achieve the goal Information-
Provided and to obtained the resource PatientPersonalInformation. The goal and the resource
are dependums of their respective dependency relationships. The direction of the D tag on de-
pendency relationships indicates which actor depends on the other to achieve the dependum. In
our example, the eSAP system depends on the Patient to fulfill the goal InformationProvided
and to obtain the resource PatientPersonalInformation.
Actor Agent Role Position
TaskGoal
Belief
Softgoal
Resource
Figure 7.7: Graphical representation of TROPOS concepts used in SDM
Patient
Information
Provided
D
D
eSAP
Patient
Personal
Info
D
D
Figure 7.8: Example of SDM
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The Strategic Rationale Model (SRM) While intentional dependencies among actors are
modelled in SDM, internal goals of actors are captured in the SRM. The SRM offers a deeper
understanding of a strategic actors' reasoning by determining through means-ends analysis how
goals (and softgoals) can be fulfilled through the contributions of others actors [CKM02]. The
SRM uses the concepts of goal, softgoal, plan and resource (previously described) and three kinds
of relationships: a) the means-ends relationship, b) the decomposition relationship and c) the
contribution relationship.
• a) the means-ends relationship links a plan with a goal it has the means to achieve. For
convenience, TROPOS authorizes also softgoals and resources to be means to achieve a goal ;
• b) the decomposition relationship further refines a goal by constructing a finer goals
structure under an AND or an OR decomposition. Only a plan can be decomposed into
goals, softgoals, resources and/or plans. TROPOS also allows the decomposition of a goal
(see elaboration of secure TROPOS metamodel). An AND decomposition requires that all
the sub-goals are achieved in order to fulfill the decomposed goal. In OR decomposition,
sub-goals represent alternative ways to fulfill the decomposed goal. Hence only one sub-goal
is needed to achieve the decomposed goal ;
• c) the contribution relationship permits to specify the goals or plans or resources that
can contribute positively or negatively to its achievement [BPSMa].
Fig. 7.9 depicts the graphical syntax of TROPOS relationships used in SRM. SRM concepts
have already been defined previously. Fig. 7.10 gives an overview of a SRM. It represents the
internal structure of the eSAP actor. We have chosen to refine the goal InformationProvided.
This goal was introduced in Fig. 7.8 as a dependum of the dependency relationship. In order to
achieve this goal, the eSAP system uses the plan CollectInformation. It is a means to fulfill the
root goal and it is modelled with a means-ends relationship. To perform the plan, the eSAP has to
ManageCarePlan of the Patients and it needs the PatientPersonalInformation. The sub-plan
and the resource are required in order to fully performed the plan CollectInformation.
Means-ends
relationship
Decomposition
relationship
(positive) Contribution
relationship
+
(negative) Contribution
relationship
-
Figure 7.9: Graphical representation of TROPOS relationships used in SRM
The method consists of on four development phases (briefly described below):
1. early requirements analysis consists of identifying and analyzing the different stake-
holders, in the environment of the system-to-be, and their intentions. Stakeholders are
represented by actors depending on one another for achieving goals, for performing plans
and for furnishing resources. Their intentions are modeled as goals that can be refined into
finer goals;
2. late requirements analysis aims to define the system-to-be within its operating envi-
ronment, considering its relevant functions and qualities. The system-to-be is represented
as an actor linked to other actors of the organisation via dependency relationships. These
dependencies are the functional and non-functional requirements of the system;
3. architectural design focuses on the elicitation of sub-systems (considered as actors) con-
nected through data and control flows (considered as dependencies). This design leads to
the system's global architecture;
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eSAP Obtained 
Care Information
Collect
Information
Manage
Care Plan
Patient
Personal
Information
Figure 7.10: Example of SRM
4. detailed design goes into details of the specification of the agents' micro level (see [Yu95a]).
This phase takes into account the development platform and the programming language used
to elaborated the system.
However, TROPOS method has no specific concepts related to security. Two main extensions
have been proposed, both named secure TROPOS. One is developed by H. Mouratidis et al. [MG04]
at the University of East London. Their method adds concepts related to security. The second
secure TROPOS [BMMZ06], proposed by N. Zannone from University of Trento, focuses on the
concept of trust. At this point of our work, we do not focus on the trust concept, so this second
extension of TROPOS will not be investigated.
7.2.2 Secure TROPOS : Security Extension
Secure TROPOS designed by H. Mouratidis et al. is a security extension of TROPOS that
introduces security related concepts to the TROPOS methodology [MJF06]. This extension al-
lows developers to consider security issues during IS development. Secure TROPOS supplies nine
new concepts: a) secure goal, b) secure constraint, c) secure plan, d) secure dependency, e) se-
cure resource, f) secure capability, g) threat, h) security diagram and i) security features. These
concepts are interconnected as shown on the secure TROPOS metamodel in Fig. 9.7 1. How-
ever, we are going further by considering in our analysis the improvement of secure TROPOS as
described in [MG04]. Secure TROPOS is completed with three sub-activities. 1) The system's
architectural style selection following its security requirements; 2) the transformation of the secu-
rity requirements to a design meeting these requirements and 3) the attack testing of the system
under development. We will explain in the sequel of the thesis how these three sub-activities are
integrated to the secure TROPOS process. But, first, let us have a look at the definition of the
new security concepts.
• secure goal: is a (hard)goal but with respect to security. A secure goal contributes to
attain security constraints that are imposed to an actor or exist in the system (see on secure
1Note that secure capability and threat are not represented in this metamodel because they are concepts but
not constructs of secure TROPOS.
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TROPOS metamodel in Fig. 9.7). But a secure goal does not give a precise definition of how
the secure constraint can be achieved, seeing that there are several possible alternatives;
• security constraint: is a restriction related to security interests (such as availability, in-
tegrity and privacy) which can influence the analysis and the design solutions, by conflicting
with some of the requirements of the system, or by refining some of the system's objec-
tives [Mou04];
• secure plan: is a way for satisfying (fulfilling as expressed on Fig. 9.7) a secure goal [BGG+04]
and is executed by an actor. In other words, a secure plan is a mechanism to assure protec-
tion to achieve security objectives. It may be noticed that a secure plan can have a positive
contribution (what is expected) but also a negative contribution to a security objective;
• secure dependency: introduces security constraint(s) that must be fulfilled for the depen-
dency to be satisfied [MGM03]. The depender as well as the dependee must agree on the
fulfilment of the security constraint in order to make the secure dependency valid. As under-
lined in [MG04], that means the depender expects from the dependee to satisfy the security
constraint(s) and also that the dependee will make effort to deliver the dependum by satisfying
the security constraint(s);
• secure resource: informational or physical entity related to security;
• secure capability: ability of an actor to achieve a secure goal, carry out a secure plan, and
deliver a secure resource;
• threat: represents circumstances that have the potential to cause loss or problems that can
put in danger the security features of the system [MGGP02];
• security features: also named protection properties, are features related to security that
the system-to-be must have. A security feature is represented using softgoal syntax on the
security diagram;
• security diagram: a new diagram is added to the diagrams built by TROPOS method, the
Security Diagram (SD) (an example is presented in [MGGP02]). This diagram is constructed
to gather the security requirements previously elicited during the secure TROPOS process
(we will describe this part in the sequel of this section). As presented in Fig. 7.11, SDs are
built using the concepts of security features, secure goal, secure plan and threat. The positive
or negative contributions of threats and secure goals are analysed, helping the analyst to
have an overview of the security requirements of the system-to-be.
The graphical syntax of TROPOS is extended with four new shapes as represented in Fig. 7.11.
The secure TROPOS process aims to achieve three objectives:
1. to identify the security requirements of the system-to-be;
2. to build a design that meets the specified security requirements elicited;
3. to validate the system-to-be with respect to security concerns.
The process is composed of four stages: a) environment security analysis, b) system security
analysis, c) system design and d) validation. Each stage gets closer to an operational representation
of the system.
Environment Security Analysis
From this first phase, three main outcomes are expected: a) the comprehension of the environ-
ment, b) the identification of security concerns imposed by the environment and c) the realisation
of a balance analysis. This phase thus correspond to the early requirements analysis phase de-
scribed in the TROPOS method. During this phase, the SD is built but also the actor diagram
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(S) Secure 
Task
(S) Secure 
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(S) Secure 
Resource
Depender DependeeDependum SecurityConstraint
Threat
Depender SecurityConstraint Dependum Dependee
Depender DependeeDependumSecurity
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Figure 7.11: The secure TROPOS graphical syntax (adapted from [MG04])
with the inclusion of security constraints. In addition, the security constraints imposed to actors
are further investigated by identifying which goals of the actors are restricted by these security
constraints. The assignment of a security constraint to a goal is depicted on the means-ends
diagram by the use of a constraint link having the restricts tag.
System Security Analysis
This phase corresponds to the late requirements analysis from the TROPOS method. In this
phase, the system-to-be is under further investigation. System security requirements are elicited
and the SD is used to add security concerns on the means-ends diagram of the system, leading to
the introduction of secure goals that are themselves detailed in terms of security plans.
System Design
System design gathers the architectural design and detailed design phases and goes further
by introducing testing of the developed design. The architectural design defines the system's
global architecture. The global architectural organisation is defined by selecting among alterna-
tive architectural solutions using, as criteria, the non-functional requirements of the system. This
corresponds to the first of the three sub-activities introduced in [MG04], the system's architec-
tural style selection following its security requirements. To help the analyst in measuring these
non-functional requirements, it is proposed to evaluate the concept of satisfiability discussed by
Giorgini et al in [GMNS02]. A weight is used to express the value of the satisfiability. The analysis
involves the refinement of the previous non-functional requirements to obtain more specific ones.
Note that selecting between alternative architectural styles is achieved by evaluating the secure
plans. Once the weights have been defined, the non-functional requirements have to be classified
according to the importance to the system and the identification of the architectural style that
best satisfies the most important of these non-functional requirements. More details about how
to attain this classification can be found in [GMNS02]. When an architectural style is chosen,
the transformation of the security requirements to a design meeting these requirements can begin
(this stage corresponds to the second sub-activity explained in [MG04]). New actors and their
dependencies have to be introduced as well as decomposing the existing actors into sub-actors and
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the delegation of security responsibilities from the actors to the sub-actors. The last stage of the
architectural design phase concerns the identification of capabilities for each actors by taking into
account dependency relationships of the actors [GMZ06].
The detailed design phase, the previously elicited components of the system are further speci-
fied. The actor's capabilities and the interactions related to security are described in detail.
A final phase takes place: the attack testing of the system under development (that is the third
sub-activity in [MG04]). The main aims is to let the developer see how his solution copes with
potential attacks on the newly built system. This process is based on Security Attack Scenarios
(SAS). A SAS is defined in [MG04] as an attack situation describing the agents of a multiagent
system and their secure capabilities as well as possible attackers and their goals, and it identifies
how the secure capabilities of the system prevent (if they prevent) the satisfaction of the attackers'
goals. A scenario provides enough information about the system and its environment to allow
validation of the security requirements. An attacker is defined in [MG04] as an agent who aims
to break the security of the system. Attacker intentions are modelled as goals and plans and are
elicited following the same reasoning as the one used in the TROPOS method in the goals and
plans analysis. The attacks are graphically represented by dashed links, named attack links and
identified by a attacks tag. The origin of an attack link is the attacker's goal and at its end
is the attacked resource. Secure capabilities of agent that can help to prevent identified attacks
are represented by helps dashed links. More explanations about the SAS building process is
available in [MG04]. Hence, a SAS helps to understand not only the method used by an attacker
to potentially harm the system but also why he wants to do so. Thus leads to the redefinition of
new secure capabilities and/or secure entities to protect the system from these attacks.
Validation
The last phase of secure TROPOS method is the validation phase. Two types of validation are
allowed:
• the model validation: involves the validation of the developed models with respect to a
set of validation rules:
 inter-model rules: which help to check the consistency inside a model;
 outer-model rules: which help to check the consistency between the different models
of a process.
• the design validation: corresponds to the validation of the developed solution with respect
to the security constraints of the system.
The three next modelling languages are not so well described as they are not directly presented
in the thesis. However, as they were investigated during the master thesis and as they are relevant
for security modelling during the early requirement engineering, we give an overview of them just
below.
7.3 Misuse Cases
Misuse cases, as described in [SO04], are an extension of the UML Use cases diagrams that per-
mits to express behaviour not wanted in the system-to-be in order to elicit security requirements.
Misuse cases are composed of a graphical model that is described textually as for Use cases. We
focus on the graphical representation that is the same as for Use cases diagrams but using inverted
colors as depicted in Fig. 7.12. As can be observed, Misuse cases are easily understandable without
a long speech. New concepts introduced in Misuse cases are:
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• Misuse case: a sequence of actions, including variants, that a system or other entity can
perform, interacting with misusers of the entity and causing harm to some stakeholder if the
sequence is allowed to complete [SO04];
• Misuser: an actor that initiates misuse cases, either intentionally or inadvertently [SO04];
• Mitigate relationship: some Use cases can be defined as countermeasures against Misuse
cases. In this case, the target that is mitigated by a Use case is represented with a Mitigation
relationship. You can see an example of this relationship in Fig. 7.12;
• Threaten relationship: conversely, the targeted Use case that a Misuse case wants to
harm is indicated with a Threaten relationship, as depicted in Fig. 7.12.
Figure 7.12: Misuse case example (from [SO04])
7.4 Abuse Cases
In [LNI+03a], J. McDermott and C. Fox present Abuse cases. They are another, less widespread,
security extension of UML Use cases. Abuse cases are described as a specification of a type of
complete interaction between a system and one or more actors, where the results of the interaction
are harmful to the system, one of the actors, or one of the stakeholders in the system. Abuse cases
focus on the abused privileges and describe a range of privileges that might be used to accomplish
the abuse. Harms caused by Abuse cases are textually explained.
Abuse cases do not add new syntax in the existing Use case syntax. They are represented
with the same constructs but seen from another point of view  in this case, the attacker's point
of view. To let the analysts make differentiate them, Abuse cases are not modelled in the same
diagram as Use cases.
As explained in [SO04], Abuse cases and Misuse cases are not two competing languages used to
model security risk in Use cases models. They are complementary to each other. The Abuse cases
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focus specifically on security requirements and their relation to design and testing, whereas the
Misuse cases take into consideration the elicitation of security requirements in relation to other
requirements. Fig. 7.13 depicts an example of Abuse cases diagram (based on [MF99]). This
example presents Abuse cases of an Internet-Based Information Security Laboratory.
Figure 7.13: Abuse case example (from [MF99])
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7.5 Abuse Frames
Abuse frames, described in [LNI+03b], are an extension of Jackson's Problem Frames. When
we analyse a problem, we have to identify the problem and to make the descriptions needed to
solve it. These two levels of analysis are not sufficient to handle most of the realistic problems
due to their complexity and their size. Another level is needed: structuring the problem as a
collection of interacting sub-problems that are smaller and simpler than the initial problem. This
is exactly what Problem Frames aim to.
Abuse frames allow to deals with security threat in the early requirements phase. Abuse frames
represent security threats against the system-to-be and use the same notation as Problem frames.
But each Domain is associated with a different meaning:
• the Machine domain contains the vulnerabilities exploited by malicious users in order to
achieve an attack;
• the victim domain identifies the asset that are under attack;
• the malicious user domain and an anti-requirement define the threat agent.
We define more precisely the concept of anti-requirement: an anti-requirement indicates the
intention of a malicious user that subverts an existing requirement of the system-to-be. It defines
a set of undesirable phenomena imposed by the malicious user that will ultimately cause the system
to reach a state that is inconsistent with the system requirements. [LNI+03b].
Fig. 7.14 represents a generic Abuse frame. We can see the Machine domain, the Malicious
user and the Anti-requirements as well as the Assets (Victim domain) that are threatened.
Figure 7.14: A Generic Abuse frame (from [LNI+03b])
7.6 Summary
We give of detailed description of two goal modelling languages  KeS and secure TROPOS 
that we will analyse in detail in Chapter 9. KAOS extended to Security (KeS) is an security
extension of the KAOS language and secure TROPOS is an security extension of the TROPOS
language. KeS was depicted through an example. We do not illustrate secure TROPOS at this
stage of the analysis because its concepts and their relationships need to be defined in more details.
An example will be given in the sequel. We also gave a short introduction to the Misuse cases,
the Abuse case and the Abuse frames. They are respectively security extensions of Use cases (for
Misuse and Abuse cases) and Problem frames.

Part II
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Chapter8
Eliciting ISSRM Relationships
Relationship elicitation is the first part of our contribution to the building of the ISSRM domain
model. It contributes to the step 2 of the research method (see Chapter 4). The elicitation was
performed of each of the security and risk related sources (discussed in Chapter 5). Outcomes are
gathered in Appendix 2. In this section, we discuss why relationships between concepts contained
in the ISSRM sources need to be elicited and we present, as example, the results of elicitation for
EBIOS v2.
8.1 Improve Relevant Concepts Comprehension
After having extracted relevant concepts in several ISSRM sources and having tried to har-
monize terminologies, a straightforward observation unveils itself. It is not possible to harmonize
terminologies without further information. Indeed, several imprecise elements in concept defini-
tions introduce too many doubts to confirm synonymy between concepts of the different ISSRM
sources. For example, security and risk related sources use some identical terms but with a com-
pletely different semantic, what is called a threat in a source is presented as a risk in another
one. Moreover, in the context of these sources described in Chapter 5, there are also discrepancies
or too shadowy descriptions making concepts sense fuzzy. Faced with this situation, achieving
an ISSRM domain model can seem impossible. So we decided to create, for each ISSRM source,
a graphical representation of its relevant concepts in order to improve their comprehension. A
UML Class diagram is suitable to this kind of representation as what we will design is a kind of
metamodel of the concepts described in each source and that metamodels are usually modelled
using an UML Class diagram. Each concept is translated into a UML Class and is decorated with
an UML tagged value that corresponds to the ISSRM concept considered as equivalent to this
concept. However, a key concept of UML Class diagram is still missing: relationships between
concepts. In order to complete Class diagram, ISSRM source documents have to been analysed,
focusing on elements in the sentences that concern relationships elicitation.
At the end of this work, outcomes are:
1. an improved validation of the concepts alignment in the grid. Relationships between concepts
can increase our comprehension of the concepts and so help to validate the result of the
alignment;
2. a metamodel of each ISSRM source. The metamodel gives an illustration of concepts and
relationships identified, and it is easier to validate by external people than the list of concepts
and relationships. It can also act as a quick guide to the source which is often a large
document;
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3. a summary of the relationships between ISSRM concepts. This will be the reference work
for defining relationships between concepts in the ISSRM metamodel.
8.2 Relationships Extraction
The process used to extract relationships between concepts from ISSRM sources is the same
as the one applied for the elicitation of concept definitions. As for the associated definitions
document, a document about relationships is also created. It contains excerpts of sentences from
ISSRM sources in which a proof or, at least, a clue of the existence of a relationship can be found.
In order to have a more efficient reading of this document, a special notation described below is
used.
8.3 Structure of the Relationship Explanation Document
As said before, models are represented following the UML Class Diagram syntax. The three
most common types of relationships have been retained: association, aggregation and inheritance
(generalization / specialization).
Explanations about these relationships can be found in [Hey05]:
• an association, in the context of UML Class diagrams, is defined as a link between two or
more related concepts, which are represented by classes. Each end of an association has a
role. This role consists of a name, a visibility (optional) and a multiplicity. Multiplicities can
be of many types, for example, one-to-one, many-to-many and one-to-many and many-to-
one. In this step, only associations linking two and only two classes are under investigation.
The reason is explained in the sequel. An illustration of an association can be found in
Fig. 8.1;
• an aggregation, in the context of UML Class diagrams, is a special kind of association used
when instances of a class are aggregates of instances of another one.
• an inheritance, a global name chosen to enclose generalization and specialization, is a hier-
archical relationship, allowing to manage complexity by representing, in the same diagram,
several levels of abstraction, several levels of granularity.
Notational Convention
An association relationship is represented by a UML association between two concepts (rep-
resented by UML classes). It respects the UML notation as depicted in Fig. 8.1.
Example: Threat.exploits - Vulnerability.exploits can be read: a Threat exploits a Vulner-
ability. (NB : spaces in role names are replaced by underscores). Multiplicities are not added
because in most cases no clues were given in the documentation.
Figure 8.1: UML association relationship (from EBIOS v2 Class diagram)
An aggregation relationship is represented by a UML aggregation. It respects the UML nota-
tion as depicted in Fig. 8.2.
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Example: Aggregation: Threat - Attack means that the class Threat is composed of the class
Attack.
Figure 8.2: UML aggregation relationship (from EBIOS v2 Class diagram)
An inheritance relationship is represented by a UML Generalization/Specialization. It respects
the UML notation as depicted in Fig. 8.3.
Example: Inheritance: Asset - Entity can be read: a Entity is a kind of an Asset. So the
class Asset is a supertype of the class Entity.
Figure 8.3: UML inheritance relationship (from EBIOS v2 Class diagram)
Each relationship (association, aggregation, inheritance, ...) is explained by
• either a single paragraph (or more but with similar terms or semantics) with essential key-
words. They are strong proofs (they do not require any kind of interpretation) of the exis-
tence of the relationship. These keywords are in blue italic font in the document as depicted
in Fig. 8.4;
• either by one or more paragraphs in which users have to do some interpretations to under-
stand the relationship. In this case, no keywords are directly given. An example is presented
in Fig. 8.5.
Threat agent – Attack.carries_out:
- Attack method: Standard means (action or event) by which a threat agent carries out 
an attack.
Figure 8.4: Direct elicitation of the existence of the relationship in source document (excerpt of
EBIOS v2 glossary)
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Inheritance : Asset / Key components Asset
- Key classes of components: types of devices that are important in processing, storing, or
transmitting critical information. They represent related assets to critical assets.
- Asset: something of value to the organization. Information technology assets are the
combination of logical and physical assets and are grouped into specific classes (information,
systems, software, hardware, people).
Figure 8.5: Concept that require interpretation to understand the relationship in source document
(excerpt of OCTAVE 2.0 glossary)
8.4 From Theory to Practice
We apply the process we just described, to the case of EBIOS v2 [DCS04]. This security risk
management method has been defined in Chapter 5. Just before the extraction of EBIOS rela-
tionships, the previous step had produced the grid presented in Fig. 8.6.
Figure 8.6: EBIOS v2 terminology summarized in the concept grid
The symbol / means that the ISSRM source has no concept equivalent to the one described
in the column Concept of the grid. The associated definitions related to these relevant concepts
are described in Appendix 2.
At the end of step 1 of the research method (see Chapter 4), a first version of a UML Class
diagram for EBIOS before relationships elicitation is as depicted in Fig. 8.7 where EBIOS concepts
are not related to each other.
8.4.1 Elicitation of Relationships
As we said before, for each concept, a tagged value, whose name correspond to the suitable
ISSRM concept, has been added. Moreover, the relative positioning and the background colour
of each class on the Class diagram depends of the membership of this class to one of the three
categories defined in Chapter 6:
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Figure 8.7: UML Class diagram of EBIOS v2 before relationships elicitation
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• Asset block: beige colour;
• Risk block: orange colour;
• Countermeasure block: green colour.
The next task is the elicitation of the relationships between concepts presented on the Class
diagram. The elicitation is made using common sense, i.e. by reading, comparing and discussing
with experts. Using EBIOS v2 sources [MHM07] and [DCS04], several relationships are extracted
and are summarized below. Relationships between concepts of the same groups are firstly consid-
ered and, afterwards, relationships between concepts of different groups. Groups are analysed in
the order: asset, risk, countermeasure as detailed in Tables 8.2, 8.1, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5.
We detail the elicitation of relationships for the Aggregation link between a Risk and a Threat.
We can find this definition of a Risk in EBIOS sources [DCS04]: Risk: Combination of a threat
and the losses it can cause. The term Combination of can be translated as an aggregation
relation between the Risk  the term being described  and the Threat  the term designed as a
component of the Risk.
The existence of the inheritance relationship between the concepts of Asset and Key com-
ponent asset requires a part of interpretation (see Fig. 8.5). In this case, two important ideas
can be found in the description of the concept of Asset: (a) something that has value for the
organisation and (b) information technology asset (logical or physical assets). The description of
theKey component asset contains the following notions: (a) types of devices that are important
in processing, storing, or transmitting critical information. and (b) they represent assets related
to critical assets. So, in the Key component asset, we can found the notion of value contained
in Asset  something important for an organisation is something that has value for it  and the
term device can be understood as a physical asset. The sentence they (types of devices  Key
classes of components) represent assets related to critical assets´´ seems to indicate that aKey
classes of components is a subtype of Asset. As one can see, the elicitation of this inheritance
relationship requires the interpretation of the analyst.
We follow the same line of reasoning for the rest of the relationships.
Relationships of the Assets block
Inheritance: Asset - Entity
Entity: An asset such as an organisation, site, personnel,
equipment, network. [MHM07]
Inheritance: Asset - Essential
Element
Essential element: ... Examples: - list of names; -
certification request; - invoice management; - encryption
algorithm; - etc. [MHM07]
Asset: ... Examples: - list of names; - certification request;
- invoice management; - encryption algorithm; - laptop
computer; - Ethernet; - operating system; - etc. [MHM07]
Security
Criteria.characteristic_of -
Essential Element:
The essential elements are usually functions or information
for which the owner's or holder's responsibility would be
called into question, or which would result in damage to
the organisation or third parties, if their availability,
integrity, confidentiality or other security criteria were not
guaranteed. (p. 11) [DCS04]
Table 8.1: Elicitation of relationships between concepts of Assets block
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Relationships of the Risk block
Aggregation : Risk - Threat
Risk: Combination of a threat and the losses it can
cause. [MHM07]
Aggregation : Threat - Threat
Agent
Threat: Possible attack of a threat agent on
assets. [MHM07]
Threat Agent.carries_out -
Attack:
Attack method : Standard means (action or event) by
which a threat agent carries out an attack. [MHM07]
Threat Agent.uses - Attack
Method:
The attack methods are used by threat agents which must
be characterised for each attack method. (p. 26) [DCS04]
Aggregation : Threat - Attack
Threat: Possible attack of a threat agent on
assets. [MHM07]
Aggregation : Attack - Attack
Method
Attack: Exploiting one or more vulnerabilities using an
attack method with a given opportunity. [MHM07]
Attack Method.exploits -
Vulnerability:
Attack: Exploiting one or more vulnerabilities using an
attack method with a given opportunity. [MHM07]
Aggregation : Attack -
Vulnerability
Attack: Exploiting one or more vulnerabilities using an
attack method with a given opportunity. [MHM07]
Aggregation : Risk - Impact
Risk: Combination of a threat and the losses it can
cause. [MHM07]
Impact.consequence_of -
Threat:
Impact: Consequences for an organisation when a threat is
accomplished. [MHM07]
Table 8.2: Elicitation of relationships between concepts of Risk block
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Relationships between the Assets and the Risk blocks
Risk.significance_assessed_by
- Security Criteria:
Security criterion: Characteristic of an essential element
allowing the various sensitivities to be assessed. [MHM07]
Threat.attacks - Entity:
Threat: Possible attack of a threat agent on
assets. [MHM07]
Impact.consequence_on -
Essential Element:
Impact: Consequences for an organisation when a threat
is accomplished. [MHM07]
Threat: Possible attack of a threat agent on
assets. [MHM07]
Essential element: Information or function with at least
one non-nil sensitivity. [MHM07]
Impact.damages - Security
Criteria:
The consequences of any damage can be assessed from
several points of view. The significant impacts for the
organisation must be identified by the manager using the
system. Here are some examples of damage relating to the
main security criteria (the situation and context should
lead to listing specific damage for each criterion selected)
(p. 22) [DCS04]:
• for availability:
 degrading of performance;
 short interruption;
 long interruption;
 inaccessibility;
 total loss (destruction).
• for integrity:
 accidental modification;
 deliberate modification;
 incorrect results;
 incomplete results.
• for confidentiality:
 internal disclosure;
 external disclosure.
Table 8.3: Elicitation of relationships between concepts of Assets block and Risk block
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Relationships between the Countermeasures blocks
Risk Treat-
ment.needs_definition_of -
Security Objective:
Risk treatment: Process for selecting and implementing
measures aimed at modifying the risk. [MHM07]
Security functional requirements: to contribute to
covering one or more security objectives for the target
system. [MHM07]
Security objectives: Expression of the intention to counter
identified threats or risks. [MHM07]
The security functional requirements contribute to the
treatment of ISS risks, which may consist not only in
reducing them, but also in rejecting, transferring or
assuming them. (p. 38) [DCS04]
Inheritance: Risk Treatment -
Risk Reduction
Risk reduction: Process aiming to minimise the negative
consequences and opportunities of a threat. [MHM07]
Risk treatment: Process for selecting and implementing
measures aimed at modifying the risk... [MHM07]
Inheritance: Risk Treatment -
Risk Rejection
Risk rejection: Rejection of a risk will result in security
functional requirements for a structural modification of
the target system situation that eliminates its exposure to
the risk. [MHM07]
Risk treatment: Process for selecting and implementing
measures aimed at modifying the risk. [MHM07]
Inheritance: Risk Treatment -
Risk Retention
Risk retention: Acceptance of the possible loss associated
with a particular risk. [MHM07]
Risk treatment: Process for selecting and implementing
measures aimed at modifying the risk. [MHM07]
Inheritance: Risk Treatment -
Risk Transfer
Risk transfer: Sharing with another party the possible loss
associated with a particular risk. [MHM07] newline Risk
treatment: Process for selecting and implementing
measures aimed at modifying the risk. [MHM07]
Security Functional
Requirement.covers - Security
Objective:
Security functional requirements: to contribute to
covering one or more security objectives for the target
system. [MHM07]
Security Measure.implements
- Security Functional
Requirement:
Security measure: A measure designed to improve
security, specified by a security requirement and
implemented to comply with it. [MHM07]
Table 8.4: Elicitation of relationships of concepts of Countermeasures block
Relationships between the Countermeasures and the Risk blocks
Risk Treatment.modifies -
Risk:
Risk treatment: Process for selecting and implementing
measures aimed at modifying the risk, i.e. risk reduction,
risk transfer or risk retention. [MHM07]
Security Objective.counters -
Risk:
Security objectives: Expression of the intention to counter
identified threats or risks (depending on the
context). [MHM07]
Table 8.5: Elicitation of Relationships between Concepts of Countermeasures and Risk Blocks
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8.4.2 UML Class Diagram of Concepts Completed
Relationships between concepts can now be added to the class diagram related to ISSRM
sources. At the end of this process, outputs are the Class diagram as presented in Fig. 8.8, for
each of the elements of the four families studied. Comprehension of these methods, frameworks,
security or risk management standards is increasingly improved and leads to the creation of the
ISSRM domain model. Note that all relationships elicited previously are not drawn on Fig. 8.8 in
order to give a big picture of concepts and relationships from EBIOS v2 that are common with
the ISSRM domain model.
8.4.3 Creation of the ISSRM Domain Model
Analysing common concepts between all class diagrams and their relationships leads to the
design of the ISSRM domain model. Once more, common sense, human deliberation and the
experience were used.
Figure 8.8: Complete UML Class diagram of EBIOS v2
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8.4.4 Validation of Relationship Elicitation
We can ask ourselves how it is possible to validate our elicitation of the relationships between
concepts described in ISSRM sources. Even if this question is legitimate, we do not really care
about this validation. Indeed, relationship elicitation aims to validate the existence of the con-
cepts extracted from ISSRM sources. So from this point of view, we consider that validating
the relationships is not really useful. As this elicitation of relationships does not make appear
relationships between concepts that are not linked in the same way in the ISSRM domain model,
we can consider that the relationship elicitation achieves its main aim.
8.5 Other standards
The security and risk related sources described in Chapter 5 have all been analysed in order
to elicitation the relationships between their concepts. We applied the same process that we used
for the elicitation of the relationships of EBIOS v2. Outcomes of this elicitation can be found in
Appendix 2.
8.6 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed why the extraction of relationships from security and risk related
sources was needed in order to enhance the ISSRM domain model. We also explained the way we
elicited these relationships and the glossary where they are gathered. We presented the elicitation
of EBIOS v2 relationships. Finally we discussed the validity of our extraction of the relationships.
This address the first objective of the thesis and we will new focus on the second objective. The
elicited relationships were used to improve the ISSRM domain model. The choice of relationships
that have been added in the ISSRM domain model was on the behalf of N. Mayer.

Chapter9
Alignment of KeS and Secure TROPOS
with the ISSRM Domain Model
9.1 Step 3 of the Research Method
The ISSRM domain model is to be used as a framework for security modelling languages.
We consider security modelling languages that we described in Chapter 7. These five languages
 KeS, secure TROPOS, Misuse cases, Abuse cases and Abuse frames  have been analysed. We
focus on Kes and secure TROPOS. The analyses of the other security modelling languages can
be found in Appendix 3. As underlined in [MHM07]: as outcome of this process, we will obtain
the coverage of each existing languages with respect to the ISSRM domain model and a) obvi-
ously the gaps to fill to fully support ISSRM but also b) concepts that ISSRM should perhaps take
into account. Fig. 9.1 gives a graphical representation of the retained process described just below.
For each of them, the analysis follows this process:
1. comparison between the ISSRM model with the metamodel of related/close languages
(a) take relevant textual documents as reference documents for the language to analyse;
(b) search the metamodel of the language;
→ if not available, build it following the method below:
• put discovered concepts on the metamodel;
• create a glossary containing each concept and its definition extracted from reference
documents (write explicitly the page number and the document where definition
comes from);
• search for relationships (UML association, inheritance, aggregation/composition)
between concepts and give a role to the associations (an active role [i.e: conceptA
mitigates conceptB and not conceptB is mitigated by conceptA]);
• create a glossary containing each relationship (and role if available) and sentences,
figures, examples from reference documents which explain, prove the existence of
this relationship;
• check if
 there is no UML semantic inconsistency (cyclic inheritance or cyclic aggrega-
tion);
 there is no security risk domain inconsistency (e.g.: security requirement in-
creases risk);
 there is no semantically equivalent relationships by transitivity.
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ISSRM domain model
Meta-model Glossary
Concept 
coverage table
ISSRM-oriented
language meta-
model
Coverage of ISSRM domain
model by language
Security-oriented language
Meta-model
Documentation
Concept alignment between the 
language and the ISSRM domain
model
Figure 9.1: Comparison between ISSRM domain model and security-oriented languages
(from [MHM07])
if none of the 3 cases above : continue.
else iterate the metamodel build process
(c) choose or build an example modelled with the metamodel of the language;
(d) align concepts of the language, based on:
i. the metamodel of the investigated security risk modelling language;
ii. the textual descriptions contained in source documents;
iii. the example obtained in previously.
with the concepts of the ISSRM domain model. Some interpretations and corrections
could be necessary due to the fact that manipulating concept definitions can lead to
discover some hidden sense. This step is thus done iteratively;
(e) draw the ISSRM-oriented language metamodel of the investigated language. This meta-
model contains only the concepts that are aligned with the ISSRM domain model. This
metamodel presents the overlap between the security modelling language and the IS-
SRM domain model;
2. highlight the lack (concepts + relationships) in the supporting modelling language, based
on its alignment with the ISSRM domain model. (Note that this stage is performed in
Chapter 10).
The process of step 3 is used to drive the alignments of the KeS and secure TROPOS languages
(also used for the three other security modelling languages that can be found in Appendix 3).
Note that the description of the alignments of KeS and secure TROPOS follows, step by step, the
process. So we do not refer directly to it.
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9.2 Alignment of KeS with the ISSRM Domain Model
Based on the metamodel of KeS, its description presented in Chapter 7 and the Banking Ser-
vices example described in 7.1, we proposed in Table 9.2 the alignment of KeS concepts and ISSRM
domain model concepts. We split the analysis into three blocks corresponding to the asset-related,
risk-related and risk treatment-related concepts.
Asset-related concepts: Kes deals with the security of the system-to-be, but it does not
distinguish the IS and business aspects. We align KeS Object as ISSRM concepts of Asset, Busi-
ness asset and IS asset. KeS states of the system-to-be are described using Object attributes.
Introducing security Goals aims to protect the system against security threats. Security Goals
should define confidentiality, privacy, integrity and availability of Object attributes. ISSRM secu-
rity criteria can be aligned with KeS Object attributes.
Risk-related concepts: KeS Anti-goal is also called obstacle or threat. It can be identified
at various abstraction levels and, depending on this level, may need to be refined until reaching
Anti-requirements or Anti-expectations that are assigned to Anti-agents.
At the higher level of abstraction, we consider the Anti-goal as the ISSRM Cause of the risk.
This Cause of the risk is defined in the ISSRM domain model as the combination of a ISSRM
Threat and one or more ISSRM Vulnerabilities.
At a lower abstraction level, the Anti-goal (or Anti-requirement or Anti-expectation) denotes
an ISSRM Threat which is a potential attack or incident to assets.
ISSRM Vulnerabilities are modelled as KeS Domain properties. A Domain property is an
hypothesis about the domain that holds independently of the system-to-be. This corresponds to
ISSRM Vulnerabilities that are characteristics of ISSRM Assets.
ISSRM Threat is composed of a Threat agent and an Attack method. A Threat agent can
potentially cause harm to the assets. KeS Anti-agent (also called attacker) monitors or controls
Objects and their Attributes. An Anti-agent is thus capable of threatening Objects of the system-
to-be. We decide to align the ISSRM Threat agent with the KeS Anti-agent.
Concerning the Attack method as defined in the ISSRM domain model, it is clear that it
characterises the means by which a Threat agent carries out his attack. KeS Anti-agent performs
Operations that satisfy his Anti-goal. Operations change the state of the system-to-be using in-
put/output relationships over the Objects and their Attributes. This means that by performing
Operations, the Anti-agent breaks the security criteria related to the Objects attributes. The
ISSRM Attack method can be represented in KeS using a set of constructs that are elements of
the operationalization of the Anti-goal. These constructs are namely Operationalization, Domain
and Required properties and Operations.
The two last concepts of the block of the risk-related concepts are ISSRM Risk and Impact.
They have no equivalent in the KeS language. This can be explained by the fact that KeS was
not specifically designed to consider the business context of an IS.
Risk Treatment-related concepts: ISSRM Risk treatment decisions correspond to the
countermeasures cited in [vL04, vLL]. The countermeasures are elaborated after the identification
of Anti-goals. Each Anti-goal can be categorized as described in Table 9.1. The countermeasures
are not KeS constructs but are modelling idioms or patterns adopted by modellers.
The elaboration of countermeasures usually results in new KeS security Goals that are them-
selves refined as new realizable security Requirements and security Expectations. This leads us
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to consider ISSRM security Requirements as the KeS security Goals (security Requirements and
security Expectations).
The refinement and the operationalization of the new security Goals, their concerned Objects
and Attributes and the Agents who are responsible for them form the new components of the
system-to-be realising the necessary security means. These new system components correspond
to ISSRM Controls.
Risk treatment
decisions
KeS
Countermeasures Description
Avoiding risk
Goal substitution
Choose an alternative goal producing a different
design.
Goal weakening
Change the specification of a goal so as to make it
circumvent the threatening anti-goal.
Agent substitution
Change the agent assignment (internal) so that the
obstacle scenario may no longer occur.
Transferring risk Agent substitution
Change the agent assignment (outsourcing) so that
the obstacle scenario may no longer occur.
Retaining risk Goal restoration
Add a new goal stating that if the obstacle
condition becomes true then the obstructed goal
assertion should be satisfied again in some
reasonably near future. The behaviour of the
obstacle is thus tolerated.
Reducing Risk
Anti-goal
mitigation
Tolerate the anti-goal (cause of the risk) but
mitigate its effects.
Anti-goal
prevention
Add a new goal requiring the anti-goal to be
avoided (mitigated in therms of ISSRM).
Protect
vulnerability
Make the derived vulnerability unmonitorable by
the attacker.
Defuse threat
Make the derived anti-requirement uncontrollable
by the attacker.
Avoid vulnerability
Add a new goal requiring the anti-goal to be
avoided (mitigated in terms of ISSRM).
Table 9.1: Correspondence between the ISSRM risk treatment decisions and KeS countermeasures
(countermeasures definitions adapted from [vLL, vL04])
Fig. 9.2 and Fig. 9.3 present the KeS metamodel. Each KeS metaclass possesses tagged values
indicating the corresponding ISSRM concept and KeS synonyms used in [vL04]. Moreover, meta-
model elements are gathered according to corresponding ISSRM domain model elements. The two
figures present the alignment of the KeS metamodel with respect to the ISSRM domain model (see
Chapter 6). Fig. 9.2 identifies the asset- and risk-related concepts of the ISSRM domain model
described in [vL04]. Fig. 9.3 presents the security Goals, which correspond to the ISSRM security
Requirements. Other ISSRM security treatment-related concepts are not modelling constructs of
the KeS language but modelling idioms or patterns (see Table 9.1). On the other hand, the anal-
ysis of security Goals involves the specification of new goal models, which metamodel is depicted
in Fig. 7.1.
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ISSRM domain model
KeS
Synonyms
Language
concept
Element from
our example
Asset-
related
concepts
Asset
Asset, object Object
Database Of
Account NumbersBusiness asset
IS asset
Security criteria 
Object attribute(s)
concerned by
Anti-goal
AccountNumbers,
PinCodes
Risk-
related
concepts
Risk   
Impact   
Cause of the
risk
Malicious obstacle,
Anti-goal,
Goal-anchored,
Goal negation,
Anti-requirement,
Anti-expectation
Obstacle (when
negating security
Goal), Goal,
Requirement and
Expectation (in
anti-model)
Payment Medium
Known By Thief,
Matching Accounts
Found, Account
Checked For Pin
Match
Threat
Vulnerability
Vulnerability,
Domain property
Domain property CheckRepeatable
Threat agent
Attacker, Malicious
agent, Anti-agent
Agent Attacker
Attack method
Potential
capabilities of the
attacker
Operationalization
+ Domain and
required conditions
+ Operations
Input Next
Account Number,
Check If Account
Number Match
Risk
treat-
ment
-related
concepts
Risk treatment
decision
Countermeasures 
Vulnerability
avoidance
Security
requirements
Security goal,
Security
requirements,
Security
expectations
Goal, Requirement,
Expectation
Avoid[Repeatable
Pin Check From
Account Number],
Avoid[Repeatable
Account Number
Check From Pin]
Control 
New model
implementing
security
components

Table 9.2: Alignment between KeS and the ISSRM domain model
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Figure 9.2: Alignment of KeS with ISSRM domain model (focus on risk- and assets-related con-
cepts)
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Figure 9.3: Alignment of KeS with ISSRM domain model (focus on risk treatment-related con-
cepts)
9.3 Secure TROPOS
Before describing the alignment of secure TROPOS with the ISSRM domain model, we need to
investigate in further detail the syntax of secure TROPOS and how its concepts can be used when
modelling. We first propose a metamodel of secure TROPOS. Then we build an example based
on our metamodel. And finally, we present the alignment of secure TROPOS with the ISSRM
domain model.
9.3.1 Secure TROPOS Metamodel
Literature does not really define the secure TROPOS metamodel. In order to design one that
can help us during the alignment phase between secure TROPOS and the ISSRM domain model,
we based on the metamodel presented in [Mou06]. It lacks of precise explanations of relationships
and precise multiplicities and labels on the relationships. As secure TROPOS uses TROPOS con-
cepts, we investigated the metamodel of TROPOS presented in [BGG+04]. For sake of legibility,
the complete metamodel has been cut into three parts: TROPOS metamodel specifying a) the
actor concept Fig. 9.4, b) the goal concept Fig. 9.5 and c) the plan concept Fig. 9.6. Finally, we
took into account the metamodel of the Goal-oriented Requirements Language (GRL) [HSDP06],
a member of the i∗ family of languages for which a metamodel had already been investigated by
our supervisors.
Fig. 9.4 represents the concept of Actor and the Dependency relationship. The Depender and
Dependee roles of the Dependency relationships are played by Actors. A Dependency also has a
Dependum that can be either a Plan, a Resource or a Goal. The why link of the Dependency is
presented as an optional reason for the dependency [BGG+04]. Without any further informa-
tion, the usefulness of the why link does not seem relevant to us. We just do not retain it. The
TROPOS philosophy is to design a model by beginning with the elicitation of the actors' goals.
This explains the existence of the wants association between actors and goals on the metamodel.
The last concept still not discussed in Fig. 9.4 is Belief. A Belief is something that an actor takes
for the truth from his point of view.
Fig. 9.5 illustrates the concept of Goal. A Goal can be an Hardgoal (usually called Goal) or a
Softgoal. It can be decomposed depending on Decomposition relationships into a set of sub-goals.
The notion of Means-ends analysis and Contribution as described in [BGG+04] are quite different
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Figure 9.4: The UML class diagram specifying the actor concept in the TROPOS metamodel
(adapted from [BGG+04])
from the notion of Means-ends relationship and Contribution relationship as described in i∗, and
we will discuss the difference in 9.3.1.
Fig. 9.6 focuses on the concept of Plan. A Plan fulfills a Goal on the behalf of an Actor. A
Plan can be deeper analysed by using a AND-OR decomposition.
The secure TROPOS metamodel, presented in [Mou06] and depicted in Fig. 9.7, introduces
five new concepts related to the security: a) the secure Goal, b) the secure Resource, c) the secure
Plan, d) the security Constraint and e) the secure Dependency. As for Goals, a secure Goal is
fulfilled by secure Plans and it contributes to achieve security Constraints. As different types of
constraints can be introduced during the design of the system-to-be, for example performance
or reliability constraints), a security Constraint is a specialization of the concept of Constraint
and it restricts Dependencies. The same argumentation holds for secure Dependency related to
Dependency concept. The three subtypes of secure Dependency: a) Double SD (Double Secure
Dependency), b) Depender SD and c) Dependee SD make possible to described the type of a
secure Dependency (see Fig. 7.11).
The last metamodel we used to create our secure TROPOS metamodel is the GRL meta-
model. GRL is the result of the integration of the i∗ goal-modelling language [Yu97] and the
Non-Functional Requirements (NFR) framework [MCN97]. Fig. 9.8 describes the five types of
GRL intentional elements  Softgoal, Resource, Task, Goal and Belief  and how they participate
to Dependency, Correlation and Contribution relationships. Moreover, it details the five kinds
of GRL intentional relationships: Contribution, Means-ends, Decomposition, Dependency and
Correlation. Fig. 9.9 depicts how the GRL intentional elements participates to Means-ends and
Decomposition relationships and goes in deeper details for Dependency, Correlation and Contri-
bution relationships.
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Figure 9.5: The UML class diagram specifying the goal concept in the TROPOS metamodel
(adapted from [BGG+04])
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Figure 9.6: The UML class diagram specifying the Plan/Task concept in the TROPOS metamodel
(adapted from [BGG+04])
Combining the three previously cited metamodels (of TROPOS, secure TROPOS and GRL),
we achieve a new one depicted in Fig. 9.10, Fig. 9.11, Fig. 9.12. We decompose it into three parts
for sake of legibility.
The first part  Fig. 9.10  zooms on the secure TROPOS concepts: a) Softgoal, b) Resource,
c) Plan, d) Goal, e) Threat, f) Belief and g) security Constraint. The first four can be gathered
as the common abstract concept of Possible Roles of the relationships described in Fig. 9.12. In
order to include security concepts and as the security version of TROPOS concepts are used in
the same relationships as normal (not secure) version, we add an attribute isSecure in the UML
classes that represent concepts that can be seen as a secure version. This attribute is a String
having cardinality [0..1]. Cardinality 1 makes the concept secure. The definitions of Softgoal,
Resource, Plan, Goal and Belief come from [BGG+04] and are kept without any kind of changes.
The definitions of their secure versions, included the notion of security Constraint, can be found
in [MGGP02, Mou06, MG04]. Concerning security Constraint, we choose to express the kind
of constrained entity related to the security Constraint by adding two attributes Depender and
Dependee. Having the value 1 for one of the two attributes is an exclusive situation. Indeed,
a security constraint can be defined without any Depender or Dependee attributes. This is the
case when security Constraint does not participate to a secure Dependency relationship. But
when it participates to secure Dependency relationship, it can only be linked to the Depender
or to the Dependee, not both at the same time. The Threat corresponds to the definition given
in [MGGP02]. An Actor holds Possible Roles meaning that an Actor wants to satisficy a Softgoal,
to achieve a Goal, to perform a Plan or to make a Resource available [MHO07]. An Actor has
also security Constraints that he tries to fulfill and Beliefs that he has on the environment of
the system-to-be. Contributee and Contributor are two abstract classes whose purpose is only to
allow UML associations between the possible underlying concepts that can be Contributor and/or
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Figure 9.7: The secure TROPOS metamodel (adapted from [Mou06])
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Figure 9.8: GRL metamodel: Zoom on intentional elements (from [HSDP06])
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Figure 9.9: GRL metamodel: Zoom on intentional relationships (from [HSDP06])
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Contributee. All types of Contributee can also be Contributor including Plan and Threat too.
We consider that only negative Contribution relationship can link a Threat to Softgoals. The
inheritance relationships of Depender/Depender, Contributee and Contributor are discussed when
describing Fig. 9.12.
Fig. 9.11 goes into further detail relating to the secure TROPOS relationships. Secure TROPOS
handles six types of relationships:
• Contribution: we define a contribution relationship as a relationship showing the impact of
a Contributor on a Contributee [MHO07];
• Dependency: a dependency indicates "that one actor depends, for some reason, on the other
in order to attain some goal, execute some plan, or deliver a resource." [BGG+04];
• Means-ends: the Means-ends relationship specifies a means (represented by a Goal) to satisfy
a Plan [KSR];
• Decomposition: the decomposition relationship defines the sub-components of a Plan [MHO07];
• Restricts: a restricts relationship expresses a restriction of a security Constraint on a Goal.
A restriction is a kind of property that the Goal must respect.
• Attacks: an attacks relationship shows which is the target of an attacker's Plan. Note that
our definition is quite different from the one cited in [MG04].
Fig. 9.12 zooms on the secure TROPOS relationships and particularly the authorized types
of the concepts that they connect. We have already analysed the Depender and Dependee of a
Dependency relationship. We focus now on its Dependum. The Dependum is the object around
which the Dependency centers [BGG+04, BPSMb]. The type of the Dependum can be one of the
Possible Roles (see Fig. 9.10). A secure Dependency is a sub-type of Dependency. It is defined as
a Dependency restricted by a security Constraint. A detailed definition is available in [MGGP02].
A secure Dependency can be constrained by several security Constraints that restrict either the
Depender  that corresponds to a Depender SCs  or the Dependee  that corresponds to a De-
pendee SCs. We assume that a secure Dependency can have several Depender SC and/or several
Dependee SC. Referring to [HSDP06], only a Plan can be decomposed into elements whose type
belongs to Possible Roles. Note that in order to realise the Plan, all the sub-components needs to
be achieved. To satisfy a Goal, several alternative Plans can be considered. These alternative
means are expressed by a Means-ends relationships.
Characteristics of our Secure TROPOS Metamodel
As we presented previously, our secure TROPOS metamodel introduces some restrictions in
comparison with the TROPOS and other secure TROPOS metamodels. The motivation for these
restrictions is that we want to design a metamodel which, on the one hand, leaves as little as
necessary in the interpretation of the language's semantics but, on another hand, will be power-
ful enough to model everything proposed in secure TROPOS [MGGP02, GMZ06, MG04, Mou06].
The results are that our metamodel is less inclined to be understood in different manners. Building
a restrictive metamodel could be seen as an obstacle to an intuitive modelling. We discuss below
how our metamodel can be used to model situations that are supported with other metamodel of
(secure) TROPOS.
Contribution Relationship between a Goal and a Softgoal. If we consider the construc-
tion depicted in Fig. 9.13 in which a Goal positively contributes to a Softgoal (same reasoning for
negative contribution), our metamodel can express this situation by adding a Plan as a means to
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Figure 9.10: Our secure TROPOS metamodel: Zoom on secure TROPOS concepts
Figure 9.11: Our secure TROPOS metamodel: Zoom on the different types of secure TROPOS
relationships
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Figure 9.12: Our secure TROPOS metamodel: Zoom on the secure TROPOS relationships com-
ponents
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achieve the Goal and the Plan can contribute positively (or respectively negatively) to the Softgoal
(see Fig. 9.14). Indeed, if a Plan P, that is a means to achieve a goal G, contributes (for example,
positively) to a Softgoal SG, than we can consider that by achieving the Goal G, the Plan P
contributes in a positive way to Softgoal SG and thus that the Goal G contributes to attain the
Softgoal SG.
Softgoal Goal
+
Illegal construction 
considering our secure 
Tropos metamodel
Figure 9.13: Illegal contribution of a Goal to a Softgoal
Softgoal
Task
Goal
+
+
Figure 9.14: Underlying concepts used to express the contribution relationship from a Goal to a
Softgoal using our secure TROPOS metamodel
Decomposition and Means-ends Relationships In TROPOS [BGG+04], the following de-
composition is legal (see Fig. 9.15). According to our secure TROPOS metamodel, only a Plan
can be decomposed into sub components (which are Softgoal, Goal, Resource or Plan). So, as
depicted in Fig. 9.16 in order to represent some sub-goals of a Goal, we first have to find a Plan
that is a means to achieve the Goal. Then we can decompose the Plan into sub-goals. Even if
this intermediate step can seem constraining, it can lead to investigate possible hidden sub-goals.
Indeed, by defining the Plan, we can discover that this Plan can be subdivided into unelicited
sub-goals. The decomposition between the Plan and the sub-goals is, from the point of view of
our secure TROPOS, an AND Decomposition. All sub-goals need to be fulfilled in order to realise
the Plan and thus to achieve the main Goal. We choose this interpretation for the decomposition
since it permits to strictly refer to the metamodel whatever the type of the sub-components.
An underlying question is: how to represent a OR decomposition from a Goal into sub-goals
according to our secure TROPOS metamodel . The solution depends on a characteristic of the
Means-ends relationships in the context of our metamodel. Our Means-ends relationship presents
alternatives to attain a Goal. As for Decomposition, we restrict the meaning of the Means-ends
in order to limit the number of basic concepts needed to understand a secure TROPOS model.
So in order to express an OR decomposition or an AND means-ends, we have to use a set of
Decomposition and Means-ends relationships. A brief example is given in Fig. 9.17.
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Goal
Sub goal Sub goal
AND or OR 
decomposition 
(not relevant for our 
purpose)
Figure 9.15: Example of the decomposition of a Goal into sub-goals following the TROPOS
metamodel (AND or OR decomposition)
Task
Goal
Sub goal Sub goal
Our Decomposition 
relationship is an AND 
decomposition
Figure 9.16: Expression of the decomposition of a Goal into sub-goals following our secure TRO-
POS metamodel
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Sub goal 2Sub goal 1
Task T
Task T
Sub goal 2Sub goal 1
Sub goal
Task Task
We want to express
 an OR
 decomposition
Figure 9.17: Example representing the expression of an OR decomposition following our secure
TROPOS metamodel
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Restricts Relationship. As depicted in Fig. 9.12, a security Constraint restricts a secure De-
pendency. In other words, it means that a security Constraint restricts the Dependum of the
secure Dependency. On another hand, the Restricts relationship has only Goals as Restrictee. We
made the choice to keep what should look as an inconsistency because a) it respects the litera-
ture [MG04] on this aspect and b) the Restricts relationship can indirectly restrict any concept of
a type supported by the Possible Roles class. Indeed, using Decomposition and/or Means-ends, we
can argue that the restriction affects the sub-components of the Decomposition and/or Means-ends
relationships.
9.3.2 eSAP Example
We elaborated an example with our secure TROPOS in order to illustrate the alignment be-
tween the ISSRM concepts and secure TROPOS concepts. The alignment is described in 9.3.3.
We based on the subject  the eSAP system  already discussed in [MGM] but we imagined new
features required by the actors of the system-to-be. Moreover, we did not exactly follow the (se-
cure) TROPOS method. We designed step by step the system-to-be, each step making a deeper
investigation in the system's analysis. Our example takes place in the Health Care sector. The
system-to-be is called the electronic Single Assessment Process (eSAP) and is designed in order
to deliver an integrated assessment of health and social care needs of  patients [MGM]. One of
the most important aspects to make the eSAP running is the Patient Personal Information.
This information to be provided by the Patient is the first Goal elicited from eSAP. Following our
secure TROPOS metamodel, the situation is designed as two Actors (Patient and eSAP) linked
together by a Dependency relationship, as depicted in Fig. 9.18. The Depender is the eSAP sys-
tem, the Dependee is the Patient and the Dependum is the Goal labelled Information Provided.
Patient Information
Provided
D
D
eSAP
Patient
Personal
Info
Figure 9.18: Elicitation of the dependencies between the eSAP system and a Patient
A Social Worker is in charge of the management of care plan of patients. In order to do his
work, he needs the Patient Personal Information. In our modelling, the Social Worker has
a Goal Obtained Care Information that depends on the eSAP system. However, as the Patient
Personal Information is an valuable asset for the system, achieving the Social Worker's Goal is
submitted to a security property assuring that the Patient's Consent has been obtained before
his personal information be sent to a third party. We model this constraint on the Social Worker's
goal as a dependency between him and the eSAP system having as dependum the Obtained Care
Information goal. We added a security Constraint on the behalf of the eSAP ensuring that the
Patient Personal Information is shared only if his consent has been obtained. As this con-
straint has to be respected by the eSAP, the discussed Goal and constraint were placed within the
eSAP actor. The restricts relationship permits to link the constraint to the targeted goal. The
relationship between the Social Worker and the eSAP system is presented in Fig. 9.19.
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Figure 9.19: Presentation of the relationship between the Social Worker and the eSAP system
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Figure 9.20: eSAP system internal structure refinement
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Once dependencies between Actors are elicited, we focus on the internal structure of the eSAP
system, taking from starting point the Obtained Care Information Goal as it is under the re-
sponsibility of the eSAP. We try to refine the goal by expressing means to achieve it (see Fig. 9.20).
In our case, we retain the Plan Collect Information. This Plan is the process needed to gather
the Patient Personal Information. So in order to realise it, the eSAP system needs the Resource
Patient Personal Information but also the Plan Manage Care Plan. Without this Plan, the
eSAP system does not have the Patient's Care Plan under its responsibility, so it cannot collect
Patient's information. The necessity of the sub-resource and the sub-plan is expressed using a
Decomposition relationship. Following our secure TROPOS metamodel, this kind of relationship
is a type of AND Decomposition, which corresponds to our depicted situation. As we are build-
ing the design of the system-to-be step by step, we keep concepts previously added: the security
Constraint Share Info Only If Consent Obtained and the related restricts relationship.
Fig. 9.21 focuses on the possible risks to which the system-to-be is be exposed. As exhaustivity
is not the objective of this example, we only consider the Threat Authentication Attack. Such
a Threat attempts to let a threat agent pretend he is a trusted actor from the point of view of
eSAP, in order to use privileges allowed to the fake identity to damage assets of the system. In the
Health Care sector, a main risk is a breach in the privacy of the Patient Personal Information.
So the risk Authentication Attack has a negative influence on the Privacy Softgoal. To take
into account the privacy aspect in the eSAP system, we introduce a new security Constraint Keep
System Data Privacy that has a positive influence on the privacy of the system and that can
make the possible risk harder to realise. Note that the Authentication Attack is not placed as
an internal concept of the eSAP. Indeed, the risk does not depend on the existence of the actor
whose assets it threatens.
eSAP
Privacy
Keep System
Data Privacy
+
Authentication
Attack
-
-
Figure 9.21: Investigation of the security risk against the eSAP system
We merge concepts added in Fig. 9.20 and Fig. 9.21 and elicited Plans aiming to respect the
security Constraint Keep System Data Privacy (Fig. 9.22). The secure Plan Perform Author-
ization Checks is a means to ensure the system privacy (see System Privacy Ensured Goal in
Fig. 9.22). To realise the Plan, the consent on the information for which the authorization will
be checked has to be obtained. Otherwise, without access to the information, it is not possible to
check if authorization rights are respected. We represent it under a Goal related to security. The
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second element to successfully perform in order to attain the secure Plan Perform Authorization
Checks is the Plan Check Authentication (which is related to the security depicted with a (S)
tag ). The authorization on an element aims to check if an actor (whose identity is checked by
the Check Authentication Plan) has appropriate rights on a resource (rights are represented in
our case by the obtained consent) to perform an action. The security Constraint Share Info
Only If Consent obtained has a positive contributor that is a Plan labelled Check Data For
Consent. As this Plan is positively related to a security Constraint, it is also realised with respect
to security concerns. Moreover, this Plan is a means to achieve the secure Goal Consent has
been obtained previously described.
Once eSAP internal elements have been elicited, we can investigate the point of view of a pos-
sible threat agent (see Fig. 9.23). We choose to describe an attacker whose aim is to steal the
Patient Personal Information. To achieve his goal, he needs to execute an attack (depicted
as a Plan). Two sub-elements are required in order to fulfill the attack: 1) the attacker has to get
the consent of the Patient on the desired Information (the Goal Consent on Data obtained)
and 2) he needs to find the authentication code associated to the targeted Information (the Plan
Check eSAP access Repeatedly). To get the consent, two alternatives have been retained: a) to
Steal the data from a Social Worker or b) to Buy the data from an untrusted Social
Worker. These two alternatives are depicted as Plans. The Check eSAP access repeatedly
clearly exploits a vulnerability of the eSAP system that is known by the Attacker. The concept
used to model it is a Belief that positively contributes to the Decomposition relationship related
to the Check eSAP access repeatedly. The Resource targeted by the attack is the Patient
Personal Information on behalf of the eSAP system. We linked the targeted Resource to the at-
tack scenario by an attacks relationship as defined in our secure TROPOS metamodel. The entire
Fig. 9.23 can be conceptually seen as the refinement of the risk discussed in Fig. 9.20 and Fig. 9.21.
eSAP
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Care Information
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Check Data for
Consent+
Privacy
Keep System
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+
(S) Consent has
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(S) Check
Authentication
(S) System
Privacy
Ensured
Authentication
Attack
-
-
Figure 9.22: Merging of all elicited eSAP internal elements
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Figure 9.23: Internal structure of an attack against the Resource on the behalf of the eSAP system
The last step of the design of our example is the elicitation of the countermeasures that help to
mitigate the risk identified in Fig. 9.22 and its possible exploitation by an attacker (see Fig. 9.23).
From the model depicted in Fig. 9.22, we try to find an alternative means to achieve the Goal
System Privacy Ensured. A solution is to Perform Cryptographic Procedures. We add a (S)
tag in order to express that it is a newly introduced security countermeasure. This way, even if the
attacker manages to steal the Patient Personal Information Resource, he cannot use it since
he does not know the cryptographic key. Thus the privacy of the data of the system should still
be ensured. To fulfill this countermeasure Plan, three sub-elements are needed: 1) the consent on
the data to protect, 2) to encrypt data when they are sent to a third party and 3) to decrypt data
when received from a third party. Combining these three elements, we can perform cryptographic
procedures that help to ensure system privacy and thus that help to satisficy the privacy Softgoal.
We stop our example at this point of the design of the system-to-be. A complete process from
early requirements to the implementation of the system should normally require to iterate several
times on the described step, until the envisioned risks are considered acceptable or disappeared. So,
if we have to iterate on our example, the newly introduced countermeasures will become elements
of the eSAP system and the possible risks investigation will have to evaluate the vulnerabilities
linked to these new elements.
9.3.3 Alignment of Secure TROPOS and the ISSRM Domain Model
In Table 9.3 we present how the secure TROPOS covers the ISSRM domain model.
Asset-related concepts: secure TROPOS attempts to cover the entire development process
of an IS, from the early requirements to the design phase. This security modelling language is
mainly focused on the elicitation of Goals that the different Actors of the system-to-be want to
achieve. It takes into account security concerns by eliciting in terms of Threat (secure TROPOS
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Figure 9.24: Refinement of countermeasures to mitigate revealed risks
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concept) the possible risks against the system and by constructing in terms of Goals the objectives
of potential attackers. If we begin by considering the ISSRM concept of security criteria, we can
find two secure TROPOS concepts corresponding to it: a) the security Feature and b) the security
Constraint.
A security Feature (also called Protection Property) is described in [MGGP02] as a feature
associated to security that the system-to-be must have. Examples of security features are privacy,
safety, accountability, availability and integrity. This definition covers the semantics of the IS-
SRM concept of security criteria given in [MHM07]: properties or constraints on business assets
characterising their security needs. Moreover, [MHM07] gives, as examples of security criteria,
terms like confidentiality, integrity and availability. The second concept, security Constraint, is
defined in [MGGP02]: constraint that is related to the security of the system. An example of
a security Constraint can be found in our example in Fig. 9.19, represented with a white cloud
shape and labelled Share Info Only If Consent Obtained. It appears that Softgoals that have
a label specific to security (for example: privacy) can be considered as security criteria. But we
have to be aware that such Softgoals represent a higher level of security criteria than security Con-
straints. This is mainly reflected in the label of the two kinds of concepts. Moreover, a Softgoal
used as security criterion can only be used on a SRM, so it cannot be placed on secure dependency
relationships.
Once the alignment of ISSRM security criteria is done, we can investigate the notion of Asset.
A relevant clue is given in ISSRM definition of security criteria: properties or constraints on busi-
ness assets. As shown in the ISSRM domain model [MHM07], there is an association relationship
between security criteria and business assets. Secure TROPOS expresses such a constraint using
a secure Dependency. A security Constraint can be an element of a secure Dependency that con-
strains the Depender or Dependee (as described in 7.2.2 on the achievement of the Dependum).
The Dependency relationship links two Actors or Possible Roles, meaning that one needs either a
Goal, either a Softgoal, either a Plan or either a Resource from another one. Hence, each Depen-
dum linked with the analysed organisation can be considered as an asset. As said in the definition
of asset from ISSRM domain model, asset is anything that has value to the organisation and
necessary for achieving its objectives [MHM07]. The definition of the Dependency relationship
has the idea of the necessary element to achieve an objective: dependency between two actors
indicates that one actor (the Dependee) depends for some reason on another one (the Depender)
in order to achieve a goal, to execute a task, to deliver a resource [MHM07].
We cannot give a clear criterion to distinguish Business assets from IS assets. In fact, the
type of an asset depends on the context in which we consider this asset. If an asset supports
another asset and is a part of the system, it is possible for this asset to be categorized as an IS
asset. However, we can define that an asset used as Dependum in a Dependency relationship is
a Business asset. Another tricky problem is the limitation of the secure TROPOS metamodel
which does not authorize a Dependency relationship having an Actor as Dependum. This situa-
tion can be resolved by representing, in secure TROPOS, the unauthorized relationship using as a
combination of different Dependums of Dependency relationships. Hence, we can add the concept
of Actor to the alignment with the ISSRM concept of asset. On the other hand, Business asset
represents information or process inherent to the business of the organisation that has value to the
organisation and is necessary for achieving its objectives [MHM07]. The secure TROPOS notion
of Resource can be aligned with the term information in Business asset definition. We align
secure TROPOS Plan with process. Concerning the notion of Goal and Softgoal that should be
able to be considered as Business assets, we propose the following explanation to achieve the align-
ment. Goals and Softgoals are neither information nor processes. However, we can consider that a
(soft)Goal can be achieved by a combination of Resources and Plans in the internal environment
of the Actor responsible of the Goal. An example is given in Fig. 9.20 where the Goal Dependum
Obtained Care Information can be attained by a Plan Collect Information decomposed into
a Resource Patient Personal Information and another sub-plan Manage Care Plan.
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As we can see, it is possible to achieve quite a good alignment of secure TROPOS asset-related
concepts with those from the ISSRM domain model. However, an issue is still open: following the
ISSRM domain model, only Business assets can be constrained by security criteria. But, following
our proposed distinction between IS assets and Business assets, it seems that secure TROPOS
offers the possibility to constrain IS assets too. A possible explanation is that this possibility
expresses the combination of the ISSRM constraint of association with the supports association,
linking thus IS assets to Security Criteria (see ISSRM domain model [MHM07]).
Risk-related concepts: in [MG04] a new sub-activity, called testing the developed solution, is
inserted in the secure TROPOS methodology. This activity permits to the developers to test how
their solution copes with potential attacks. The analysis of potential attacks is based on Security
Attack Scenario (SAS). A SAS is defined in [DvLF93, MG07] as an attack situation describing the
agents of a multiagent system and their secure capabilities as well as possible attacks. It involves
potential attacks to a multiagent system, a possible attacker, the resources he is attacking and
the agents of the system related to the attack. We find, in this definition, some of the risk-related
concepts such as threat agent, attack method, assets.
We did not build a SAS in our example but we used its concepts to design an attacker and his
internal structure that lead to a risk against the system-to-be. We did not consider how actors can
mitigate risks directly on the attacker model. We include such countermeasures in the internal
structure of the eSAP system. In our example, the Attacker wants to steal Patient Personal
Information using an attack method based on the knowledge of a vulnerability in the check
authentication procedure that allows to test repeatedly several solutions to match the Patient
authentication resource. Further details have already been described and can be seen in Fig. 9.23.
An ISSRM threat agent is called an attacker in secure TROPOS terminology. An attacker is
described as an agent who aims to break the security of the system [MG04]. The ISSRM threat
agent definition speaks about an agent that can potentially cause harm to assets of the IS . The
secure TROPOS notion of Agent is a kind of actor and this concept of Actor can be considered as
related to the ISSRM notion of Agent. Moreover, in each definition, the concept of harm against
assets is present. However, in order not to too restrictive with the secure TROPOS notion of
Actor, we choose to consider, as an ISSRM threat agent, not only a secure TROPOS Agent but
its concept of Actor.
The ISSRM concept of attack method is composed of the secure TROPOS concepts of Plan
(seen from the point of view of an attacker) and the secure TROPOS concept of attack relation-
ship. This attack relationship is depicted as a link containing an attacks tag (see Fig. 9.23)
and it starts from one of the attacker's Plans and ends at the attacked Resource. We consider
the Plan and the attacks link as equivalent to the ISSRM attack method because the Plan ex-
presses the way the attacker tends to harm assets and the attacks link designates the targeted
Resource. In our example, the attack method is represented by the Plan Execute attack which
targets the Patient Personal Information in the eSAP. It seems that there is an inconsistency
in [MG04, MG07]. The attacks link does not start from a Goal (as defined in [MG04]) but from
a Plan and some of the attacked Resources are Agents. If we make further investigation, we can
propose an explanation to the inconsistency. For this discussion, we base on our secure TROPOS
metamodel. The Decomposition link between the Goal Modify Content of Message and the
Plan Cryptographic Attack is an instance of a Decomposition relationship. In Fig. 9.12, the
Decomposition relationship has a relationship with the Possible Roles called component. It means
that an instance of a Decomposition relationship has a component of one and only one type of
Possible Roles. On another hand, we see that a Possible Rols is specialized into either a Softgoal,
a Resource, a Plan or a Goal. Thanks to this explanation, we can validate the Goal participating
in the Decomposition link. The usage of a Plan in the Decomposition is proved by the existence
of the association called compound between the Decomposition relationship class and the Plan.
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The non-existence of the inconsistency becomes clear when we investigate the Means-ends rela-
tionships in our secure TROPOS metamodel, which has two associations: one with the Goal class,
the second with the Plan class. We see that an instance of the Plan class expresses the means-ends
used to fulfill an instance of the Goal class. Thus, the attacks link between a Resource and a Plan
should be understood as a link between a Resource and a Goal if the previous Plan is a component
of the decomposition of the Goal. A second inconsistency appears between the term Resource in
the definition of the attacks link and the example ( [MG04]) where attacks links are attached
to Agent (secure TROPOS meaning). As written in [MG04], the second sub-goal indicates the
attacker trying to change the values in data files of the system. The fulfillment of this Goal can
be satisfied by means of changing data of resources in the eSAP system . One suggestion is that
the Resource (secure TROPOS meaning) is not mentioned for sake of brevity.
The ISSRM concept of Vulnerability has no explicit counterpart in secure TROPOS defined
in [GMZ06] [MG04]. However we think that this concept can be expressed by the TROPOS syn-
tax. Indeed, TROPOS contains the notion of Belief that is described as the actor knowledge of
the world. An attacker needs to be aware of characteristics of assets that can constitute flaws in
terms of security before he can try to threaten these assets. Our last sentence fits the definition
of ISSRM Vulnerability. The attacker in our example bases his attack on the fact (from his point
of view) that the check authentication procedure can be repeated infinitely. However, a vulnera-
bility can be expressed by a secure TROPOS Belief but the two notions are not exactly covering
the same space of knowledge. Trying to reformulate the definition of Belief, we want to draw
attention on the fact that a Belief is something that an attacker takes for real. For example, in
Fig. 9.23, the Attacker knows that it is PossibleToCheckeSAPAccessRepeatedly While a vul-
nerability is a fact, something that can be taken for sure in the environment. So, by modelling a
vulnerability as a Belief, we introduce a notion of possible mistake in the knowledge of the attacker.
This means that there might be vulnerabilities that are not known by the actor. Also, not
all the actor's knowledge about the world is correct. Thus to make alignment between Belief and
Vulnerability we should consider the intersection between these two definitions: i.e, only the facts
known by the actor, that are true.
Secure TROPOS has no precise notation for the notion of Threat as defined in the ISSRM.
An ISSRM Threat is expressed in secure TROPOS as the hierarchy of attacker's Goals, from the
unique highest Goal to its decomposition. By representing an ISSRM Threat in this way, we
achieve to align on its definition: a potential attack or incident, which targets one or more IS
assets that may lead to harm to assets. Indeed, a Goal is the expression of the wish of an Actor
and a wish is, by definition, something to be attained. Hence, it is something still remaining in the
domain of the potentiality. An attacker's wish against a system is generally something that aims
to damage the assets of the system. The Goal Obtained Care Information is the root attacker's
Goal in our example. The target of the Threat seems to not be present in secure TROPOS. But
we have already explained that a attacks link that starts from a Plan can be understood as it
starts from the Goal that is fulfilled by previously cited Plan. Referring to our example, the target
of the Threat is the Patient Personal Information Resource.
The notion of cause of the risk is represented by a secure TROPOS Threat. The Threat is
defined in [MGGP02] as circumstances that have the potential to cause loss or problems that can
put in danger the security objectives of the system. The term of cause is a clue in the process
that we used to align the secure TROPOS Threat with the ISSRM Cause of the risk. The second
reason is depicted in Fig. 9.21. The Threat is linked with assets of the system by a negative
Contribution relationship that we can consider as ISSRM Impact (discussed below). Moreover,
we can understand the concept of Threat as composed of Threat agent, Attack method, Threat
and Vulnerabilities as presented in Fig. 9.251.
1This example contains some constructs that do not belong to secure TROPOS syntax but they are used for
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Figure 9.25: Mental representation of a secure TROPOS Threat as including the Attacker actor
and his internal structure
The ISSRM concept of Impact is represented, as said before, by a negative Contribution rela-
tionship from a secure TROPOS Threat to a Softgoal related to security. This corresponds to the
definition of the ISSRM Impact: the impact can be described ... at the level of business assets,
where it negates security criteria.
The last ISSRM concept related to the risk is the concept of risk itself. There is no secure
TROPOS concept/construct to express an ISSRM risk.
Risk Treatment-related concepts: as we did in our example, once the attacker's Goals
have been investigated, it is necessary to find and include in the system-to-be countermeasures to
the risks in order to mitigate them. In our case, we introduced the Plan Perform Cryptographic
Procedures to make information unusable even if it was stolen. It fits the ISSRM security re-
quirement defined in these words: the refinement of the risk treatment decision to mitigate the
risk. Each security requirement contributes to cover one or more risk treatment decision for the
target IS . The ISSRM concept of control can be seen as the system in itself once it will be ready
for implementation. The risk treatment decision is the process leading to the introduction of the
countermeasures. So even if they do not have specific secure TROPOS concepts, these two con-
cepts are implicitly present in secure TROPOS models. Moreover, as we discussed before, when
countermeasures have been elicited, a newly iteration on the model of the system-to-be must be
performed to discover if the new introduced countermeasures  that are at this time considered
as assets of the system  introduce new security vulnerabilities which are unacceptable for the
system. This iterative process ends when all risks are evaluated as acceptable depending some
criteria (for example: time necessary to improve the system, cost of the improvement or also cost
of the damage if an attack occurs). Note that each time a modification is made to the system, a
risk analysis is required.
sake of legibility of the model. Moreover, the secure TROPOS Threat cannot be designed with another concept
within its boundary
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ISSRM domain model
Secure TROPOS
Synonyms Language concept
Element from our
example
Asset-
related
concepts
Asset 
Actor, Goal,
Softgoal, Plan and
ResourceB

Business asset 
Obtained Care
Information, Collect
Information, Manage
Care Plan, Privacy,
Patient Personal
Information
IS asset 
Perform
Authorization
Checks, Consent has
been obtained,
Check
Authentication,
System Privacy
Ensured
Security criteria
Security Feature,
Protection
PropertyA
Security Constraint
and Softgoal
Share Info only if
Consent Obtained,
Keep System Data
Privacy
Risk-
related
concepts
Risk   
Impact 
Negative
contribution
relationship

Cause of the risk  Threat
Authentication
Attack
Threat  Goals + Plans
Attack eSAP System
+ Corrupt Available
Dates + Data
change Attack
Vulnerability  BeliefC
Possible to check
authentication
repeatedly
Threat agent Attacker Actor Attacker
Attack method 
Plan + attacks
relationship
Execute attack and
Steal Data From
Social worker or Buy
Data from Untrusted
Social Worker
Risk
treat-
ment
-related
concepts
Risk treatment
decision
  
Security require-
ments
(Secure) Goal, Plan,
Resource and
Protection
ObjectiveA
Actor, Goal,
Softgoal, Plan,
ResourceB
Perform
Cryptographic
Procedures and
Encrypt Data and
Decrypt Data
Control D  
Table 9.3: Alignment between secure TROPOS and the ISSRM domain model
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A Protection Objective and Protection Property are described in [MGGP02].
B Constructs from TROPOS (not from secure TROPOS). Constructs includes: Actor, Goal,
Softgoal, Plan, Resource and Relationships. Relationships are Dependency, Means-ends, Decom-
position and Contribution.
C A Belief cannot be strictly aligned with the ISSRM vulnerability concept. To explain it,
let us consider theses definitions: Belief  the actor knowledge of the world [BGG+04]. ISSRM
vulnerability  characteristic of an IS asset or group of IS assets that can constitute a weakness
or a flaw in terms of IS security [MHM07]. This means that there might be vulnerabilities that
are not known to the actor. Additionally, not all the actor's knowledge about the world is correct.
Thus to align between Belief and Vulnerability we should consider the intersection between these
two definitions: i.e, only the facts known by the actor, that are true.
D There is no construct in secure TROPOS that refers to the ISSRM control. But a subset of
concepts composed of the countermeasures against a risk and related concepts can be considered
as control (the goal used as countermeasure and plans that refine it and eventually other related
concepts).
We proposed a graphical representation of the alignment of secure TROPOS with the ISSRM
domain model in Fig. 9.26, Fig. 9.27, Fig. 9.28. Fig. 9.26 focuses on the risk- and risk treatment-
related concepts. As we explained before, the ISSRM Cause of the risk is represented by secure
TROPOS Threat. As the ISSRM Impact is modelled using negative Contribution relationship
between a Threat and a Softgoal related to security  that corresponds to ISSRM Security cri-
terion , the Contributor of the relationship is the Softgoal and the Contributee is the Threat.
The Restrict relationship has also a Restrictor  the security Constraint  and a Restrictee that
we modelled in this diagram as Tropos constructs used to model IS and Business assets. We saw
previously in the thesis that a Restrict relationship can only link a security Constraint to a Goal.
But since Tropos constructs used to model IS and Business assets contain the Goal construct, our
modelling is correct. We use this kind of abstract class  Tropos constructs used to model IS
and Business assets  in order to hide parts of the metamodel that we do not want to discuss
in the figure. Also hidden are concepts that composed the secure TROPOS Threat  and called
Risk-related concepts describing the Cause.
Fig. 9.27 depicts concepts that composed a secure TROPOS Threat. Threat agent is mapped
on Actor. An ISSRM Threat is expressed using concepts that can compose a Means-ends and/or a
Decomposition relationships. A plan can be used as components of Means-ends and/or a Decom-
position relationships. It can also be considered as the ISSRM Attack method  in combination
with the Attacks relationship. That is why it is shared by the ISSRM Threat concepts and IS-
SRM Attack method concept. Beliefs represent a part of ISSRM Vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities
are characteristics of IS assets. Thus Belief is linked to ISSRM IS asset.
Fig. 9.28 represents ISSRM Security requirements. As we saw before, every concepts of secure
TROPOS can be considered as related to risk treatment. Indeed, changes in system-to-be's design
are made so as to mitigate risks. So the new design of the system-to-be can be seen as Security
requirements.
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Figure 9.26: Alignment of secure TROPOS concepts with ISSRM risk- and assets-related concepts
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Figure 9.27: Alignment of secure TROPOS concepts with ISSRM focusing on risk-related concepts
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Figure 9.28: Alignment of secure TROPOS concepts with ISSRM risk treatment-related concepts
9.4 Summary
The second objective of the thesis was treated in this chapter. We presented the method we used
to align concepts from security modelling languages with those from the ISSRM domain model.
We put the theory into practice for the KeS and the secure TROPOS languages. Concerning
secure TROPOS we first needed to elaborate its metamodel. Then we built the eSAP example
and, based on this example, we aligned it with the ISSRM domain model. For both languages
we depicted how they cover the concepts from the ISSRM domain model. This complete the
second objective of this thesis. The next stage is the validation of these two alignments in the
next chapter.

Part III
Evaluation
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As the validation of results is a paramount step in a scientific research method, we choose to
build a case study in order to assess the validity of our alignment of security modelling languages
with ISSRM domain model. Relevant remarks about the qualities as that a good Examplar should
have are given in [FFFvL97] as a detailed description of a case study called the Meeting Scheduler
Example. We developed our case study as an extension of the Meeting Scheduler. In the sequel
of the thesis, we will thus discuss a) the modelling of a case study in KeS and secure TROPOS
and b) the validity of our alignment presented in 9.3.3 based on models developed.
10.1 Objectives of the Exploitation of the Case Study
We will exploit models produced in secure TROPOS and KeS in order to validate the alignment
between ISSRM domain model and, respectively, secure TROPOS and KeS. If concepts used in
secure TROPOS and KeS to model a specific element of the case study have been aligned on the
same ISSRM concept, it validates the alignment with this concept of the ISSRM domain model.
If no problem arises during the complete analysis of concepts of ISSRM domain model, we can
state the validity of our alignments of KeS and secure TROPOS with the ISSRM domain model.
Then it will be to draw global conclusions on the coverage of secure TROPOS and KeS vis-à-vis
the ISSRM domain model.
10.2 The Meeting Scheduler Case Study
The Meeting Scheduler system is a computer-based scheduler for supporting the setting up of
meetings. The main requirement the system has to achieve is to determine a suitable date and
time so that most of the intended participants will be able to attend the meeting effectively. The
meeting scheduler interacts with the Meeting initiator  the agent responsible for the Meeting 
and the Meeting participants  people who are possibly interested in the meeting. The meeting
scheduling process is the following: when a meeting is to be scheduled, the initiator invites possibly
interested participants. He defines a range of dates in which the meeting has to be scheduled. He
also asks them to communicate their preferred and excluded dates depending on their personal
agendas. The initiator then waits for the meeting scheduler to receive replies from interested
participants and to compute a proposed date for the meeting. The date has to be as convenient
as possible for most of the participants. All interested participants receive the proposed date. If it
is convenient for them, they communicate their agreement to the meeting scheduler. Agreements
from all invited participants are kept in the meeting scheduler for a sufficient period of time.
These agreements are used as a kind of contract between the initiator and the participants. If a
participant does not attend the meeting without cancelling its participation to the initiator, he
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can be compelled to some constraints. For the sake of brevity, we do not care about the rest of
the meeting scheduling process. We limit the scope of the case study to this part of the scheduling
of meeting and let some points rather blurred as this description of the case study reflects the
basic knowledge of the domain that an analyst can have when beginning the early requirement
elicitation. Other features are possible but not discussed here (see Appendix 4).
Instead of presenting in more details the internal requirements and goals of each actor of the
system and, after that, focusing on the modelling in secure TROPOS and KeS, we directly give
further explanations by referring to diagrams created with secure TROPOS. The presentation
of the context of the meeting scheduler system can be overviewed in Fig. 10.1. Three actors are
present: a) the meeting initiator, b) the meeting participant and c) the meeting scheduler. The in-
vitation of initiator to participants is included in the AttendMeeting Goal. The initiator depends
on the interest of the participant to join a meeting. The initiator relies on the meeting sched-
uler for the meeting to be scheduled as expressed by the MeetingBeScheduled Goal. The Plan
EnterRangeOfDates expresses that the scheduler needs the initiator to provide a range of suitable
dates among which the meeting has to be scheduled. The ProposedDate and the Agreement are
modelled as Resources.
Meeting
Initiator
Meeting
Participant
Attends
Meeting
Agreement
Proposed
Date
DD
DD
DD
D D
Meeting
Scheduler
Enter
Availables
Dates
Meeting Be
Scheduled D
Enter Dates
Range
D D
DD
Figure 10.1: Overview of the meeting scheduler system (adapted from [Yu97])
Once we have elicited the relationships between actors, we can describe the internal modelling
of each of them using a SRM. We begin by the investigation of the Meeting initiator as depicted
in Fig. 10.2.
The Meeting initiator. The main Plan of this Actor is to OrganizeMeeting. BeScheduled
is a way to fulfill this task and the organisation of meeting should be Quick and should require
LowEffort for the initiator. Two alternatives are offered to him to achieve the scheduling of the
meeting: a) the initiator can schedule the meeting manually or b) let the scheduler do it. The
first Plan a) contributes negatively to the two Softgoals whereas the second Plan b) contributes
positively.
The Meeting participant. As his name indicates it, he has to ParticipateInMeetings. In
order to do this, he needs that a Convenient date for a meeting M is found. He also needs
AttendMeeting M. The last Plan he has to fulfill before attaining his root Plan is to Arrange-
Meeting. This arrangement should a) require Low Effort from the participant. Using a User-
Friendly system is one of the way to achieve it. b) Finding a convenient date for meeting M
must be possible  Agreeable (meeting, date). Making the date convenient for meeting M is
supported by the wish that the date is chosen as the most suitable from the point of view of the
participant. In other words, the date should not be proposed as soon as a suitable date is found
but by taking into account the most convenient date for each participant. Hence, we can speak
about the QualityOfTheProposedDate and we can consider that the richer is the medium  the
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Figure 10.2: Secure TROPOS modelling of meeting initiator (adapted from [Yu97])
manner participants communicate to agree on proposed date  better the quality of the proposed
date is. Two alternatives are considered to find agreeable dates: 1) to FindAgreeableDates-
UsingScheduler or 2) to FindAgreeableDatesTalkingToInitiator. The first is a refinement
of how a participant can make his agreement known by the meeting scheduler  AgreeToThe-
Date. Nonetheless, it does not contribute to make the medium richer and to make the system
user friendly. On the other hand, the second alternative has positive contributions on these two
sub-goals. However, both are means to find an agreeable date for meetings.
The Meeting scheduler. This is the description of the computerized part of the system-to-be
(see Fig. 10.4). The Meeting scheduler' s first Goal is that a MeetingBeScheduled. To achieve
its Goal, the system performs a Plan called ScheduleMeeting that can be decomposed into three
sub-components: a) the Plan ObtainAvailableDates, b) the Goal FindAgreeableSlot and c)
the Plan ObtainAgreement (on the agreeable slot). The Plan ObtainAvailableDates is the pro-
cess used to get the preferred and excluded dates set from all participants to the meeting M.
FindAgreeableSlot consists of computing a suitable date for the meeting M that depends on
the participants' available dates. This Plan is refined by the Plan MergeAvailableDates of all
participants. ObtainAgreement deals with waiting and ensuring that a sufficiently large number
of agreements from interested participants are received.
Once the three actors have been detailed, we can depict in Fig. 10.5 the global view of the
system. As we focus on the Meeting scheduler in the sequel of our modelling, we have looked at
the dependencies in which the scheduler is the Depender or the Dependee of the relationships. The
description given above is based on [Yu97]. We now extend the case study with security concerns
using the secure TROPOS language. The first step consists of adding security Constraints on the
Dependency relationships. We have identified three security Constraints depending on the Meet-
ing scheduler as presented in Fig. 10.6. AgreementsAvailabilityMustBeEnsured constraints the
Dependum MeetingBeScheduled on the availability criterion and it is on the behalf of the Meet-
ing scheduler. This constraint aims to ensure the availability of the agreements once the meeting
is successfully scheduled. The two other security Constraints concern the Resource Agreement
(for meeting M). OnlyUsedByParticipantsToM is a privacy criterion that restricts the use of
the agreement to only participants to meeting M. AgreedDateCannotBeChanged is related to the
integrity of data and especially to the integrity of the agreement (remember that agreements are
used as contract between initiator and participants). Once security Constraints of secure Depen-
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Figure 10.3: Secure TROPOS modelling of meeting participant (adapted from [Yu97])
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Figure 10.4: Secure TROPOS modelling of meeting scheduler (adapted from [Yu97])
dencies are elicited, the next step focuses on internal elements of the Meeting scheduler that are
affected by the security Constraints or that are put in place in order to respect these constraints.
We now extend the case study with security concerns using the secure TROPOS language.
The first step consists in adding security Constraints on the Dependency relationships. We have
identified three security Constraints depending on the Meeting scheduler as presented in Fig. 10.6.
AgreementsAvailabilityMustBeEnsured requires that the Dependum MeetingBeScheduled re-
spects the availability criterion. This security Constraint has to be ensured by the Meeting
scheduler. This constraint aims to ensure the availability of the agreements once the meeting
is successfully scheduled. The two other security Constraints concern the Resource Agreement
(for meeting M). OnlyUsedByParticipantsToM is a privacy criterion that restricts the use of
the agreement to only participants to meeting M. AgreedDateCannotBeChanged is related to the
integrity of data and especially to the integrity of the agreement (remember that agreements are
used as contract between initiator and participants). Once security Constraints of secure Depen-
dencies are elicited, the next step focuses on internal elements of the Meeting scheduler that are
affected by the security Constraints or that are put in place in order to respect these constraints.
As one can see in Fig. 10.7, the three previously elicited security Constraints are introduced
within the boundary of the Meeting scheduler. First, we define the Goals of the meeting sched-
uler that are restricted by the security Constraints. The Goal MeetingBeScheduled is restricted
by the security Constraint AgreementAvailabilityMustBeEnsured, AgreementBeConfirmed by
OnlyUsedByParticipantsToMeetingM and OldDataClearedOutFromScheduler by AgreedDate-
CannotBeChangeOnceAgreementOnMReceived. As we have taken into account security concerns of
the system-to-be, it is normal that we refine the internal structure of the Meeting scheduler. That
is why some new elements are added. The Goal AgreementBeConfirmed means that the Meeting
scheduler wants that proposed date to be agreed. It is achieved by the Plan ObtainAgreement. A
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Figure 10.5: Secure TROPOS modelling of meeting scheduler system (adapted from [Yu97])
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new requirement is introduced in the system: there must be processes that clear out old data from
the system. This is expressed by the Goal OldDataClearOutFromScheduler and it is fulfilled by
the Plan ClearOutOldData that manipulates the Agreements Resource. As the availability of the
agreements requires that they keep their integrity, the Goal AgreedDateCannotBeChangeOnce-
AgreementOnMReceived restricts the new Goal OldDataClearedOutFromScheduler.
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Figure 10.7: Security constraints and related elements in the meeting scheduler
Secondly and before investigating ways to have the system respecting the imposed security
Constraints, we have to brainstorm on the possible risks related to the security Constraints. In
Fig. 10.8 we present three risks, each one threatening a security Constraint. The way to build this
diagram is the following: a) to place the previously elicited security Constraints on the diagram;
b) to represent as Softgoals the security criteria that are threatened  in our case study: privacy,
integrity and availability; c) we imagine how which kind of risk can break the security criteria.
The label of the cause of the risk  depicted using the secure TROPOS construct of threat  should
be chosen not too general (for example, attack against privacy) but not too operational either (for
example, send confidential data to tier person). We suggest picking a label that does not begin
with a verb (infinitive mode) but by a name of the category of the known attack methods against
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the category of the security criterion at hand. For privacy, we identify the Threat Disclosure-
Attack. We add contribution relationships in order to ensure that the elicited Softgoal is positively
contributed by the security Constraint and that the identified risk has also a negative impact on this
Softgoal. As mentioned before, the security Constraint AgreementAvailabilityMustBeEnsured
is related to the Softgoal Availability which is threatened by the Threat DestructionOfThe-
Agreement. AgreedDateCannotBeChangedOnceAgreementOnMReceived concerns the Integrity
of the system thwarted by the TamperingOfAgreements.
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Figure 10.8: Elicitation of risks against security constraints and security criteria of the meeting
scheduler
Thirdly, when we know which are the security criteria concerned by the security Constraints,
we define new elements in the Meeting scheduler leading to the satisfaction of these constraints.
For the sake of legibility we create one new model per security Constraint as depicted in Fig. 10.10,
Fig. 10.9 and Fig. 10.11. We limit deliberately the description of this case study to the refinement
of the privacy constraint. We introduce the security criterion Privacy as a Softgoal in the internal
structure of the Meeting scheduler. We define the secure Plan (S) AssurePrivacy as a way to
contribute positively to the Softgoal. The (S) tag indicates that the element is related to the
security of the system. This secure Plan is decomposed into the secure sub-goal (S) PrivacyOf-
TheSystemEnsured. The process to achieve this sub-goal consists in checking the identity of the
participants  (S) CheckParticipantIdentity  that access the meeting scheduler system. The
secure Plan (S) CheckParticipantIdentity contributes positively to the security Constraint
OnlyUsedByParticipantsToMeetingM. At this point of the analysis of the system-to-be, we have
expressed the happy scenario with security concerns of the system. But, in order to reinforce the
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security, we make an analysis of the system-to-be from the point of view of an attacker. The risk
against the privacy criterion is used as a root Goal DisclosureOfAgreements in the internal struc-
ture of the attacker. One of the means to fulfill the attacker's root Goal is to DiscloseAgreements,
itself decomposed into two sub-plans ReadAgreements and SendToUnauthorizedPeople. Remem-
ber that the Decomposition relationship is equivalent to an AND decomposition when modelling
with secure TROPOS. The attack of the malicious agent can only be successful if he knows some
vulnerabilities of the system. The vulnerability that the attack method DiscloseAgreements ex-
ploits is the knowledge of the attacker who has the conviction that AgreementsAreNotEncrypted.
Once that he has his attack method and that he knows which are vulnerabilities to exploit, the at-
tacker can attack the Meeting scheduler by targeting the Agreement (for meeting M) Resource.
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Figure 10.9: Meeting scheduler extended with privacy related elements
When an attacker scenario is elaborated, we need to improve the internal structure of the
Meeting scheduler in a way that mitigates the identified attack method (see Fig. 10.13). Such
a mitigation is not always possible as we discussed previously in Chapter 3 and as depicted
in Fig. 3.2. To counter the DiscloseAgreements attack method, we introduce a new Plan (S)
PerformCryptographicProcedures that is another means to fulfill the secure Goal (S) Privacy-
OfTheSystemEnsured and that contributes positively to the security Constraint OnlyUsedBy-
ParticipantsToM. We tag the new plan with (S) meaning that this element is a countermeasure
related to security. The introduction of security countermeasures is potentially dangerous as they
can contain vulnerabilities. So for each countermeasure added to the system, we need to investigate
if new risks emerged.
We now model the same case study using the KeS language.
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Figure 10.10: Meeting scheduler extended with availability related elements
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Figure 10.13: Countermeasure against disclosure of agreements
Modelling in KeS
We model the same case with the KeS language. The approach is rather different from the
one used for secure TROPOS. Details and comparisons about the two approaches are given in the
sequel of the thesis. In this section, we explain how the KeS model is constructed step by step
considering first the point of view of the designer of the system and after that the point of view
of a potential attacker. In each case, we build in the same time the Goal (respectively Anti-goal)
model and the Object (respectively Anti-object) model.
At the beginning of the early requirements phase, the main Goal of the system-to-be is
MeetingBeScheduled. The content of the Goal has to be achieved so we can categorize it as an
Achieve Goal (the label of the Goal is preceded by Achieve and it is place into square brackets). We
distinguish two alternatives sub-goals to achieve the root Goal: a) MeetingBeManuallyScheduled
and b) MeetingBeAutomaticallyScheduled. We do not investigate the manual scheduler be-
cause it is not the envisaged scenario of our case study. In the same time, the MeetingBe-
AutomaticallyScheduled fulfills two Softgoals respectively labelled QuickScheduling and Low-
EffortScheduling. We refine the sub-goal b) until we elicit Requirements or Expectations whose
responsibility or assignment is attributed to agents. To make model legible, we split the entire
model (depicted in Fig. 10.14) into three parts Fig. 10.15, Fig. 10.16 and Fig. 10.17 corresponding
to the three agents found in the system.
The sub-goal MeetingBeAutomaticallyScheduled is decomposed into three Goals b1) Inter-
estedParticipantsForMeetingMFound, b2) PreferredAndExcludedDatesForMeetingMKnownBy-
MeetingScheduler and b3) SuitableAgreementForMObtained. All three Goals are from the cat-
egory of Achieve goals. b1) means that, in order to schedule automatically the meeting, the system
needs to find possibly interested participants for the meeting M. b2) permits to participants to send
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Figure 10.14: Complete goal model of the Meeting scheduler system (adapted from [Yu97])
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their preferred and excluded dates to the meeting scheduler system. b3) assures that the Meeting
scheduler succeeds in a agreement that is as convenient as possible for all interested participants.
In Fig. 10.15 we refine b1) into an Expectation ParticipantsInterestedInMeetingMInvited.
The expectation is assigned to the Meeting initiator.
Figure 10.15: Meeting scheduler system refined until Requirements and Expectations: focus on
the initiator Agent
Fig. 10.16 presents two Expectations AvailableDatesForMeetingMObtained and Agreement-
AboutMeetingM. The first is obtained from the Goal PreferredAndExcludedDatesForMeetingM-
KnownByMeetingParticipants and means that participants to meeting M have to transmit their
available dates to the scheduler system. The second is a refinement of the Goal Participants-
ResponseConcerningTheProposedDateForMeetingMReceived  itself obtained by successive re-
finements of the Goal b3) and explained in the sequel. Agreement about meeting M is assigned
to participants because they have to give agreements to meetings.
As presented in Fig. 10.17, the Meeting scheduler is responsible for the seven requirements,
all obtained by refinement of the goal b3) SuitableAgreementForMeetingMObtained. Two al-
ternatives to achieve the obtainment of a suitable agreement are envisaged. The first manner
(Fig. 10.18) is composed of the Goal AgreementDateFoundByUsingScheduler and two Require-
ments related to security 1) OnceObtained,AgreementBecomesUnavailable and 2) ChangingThe-
DateOfAgreemenOnMeetingM. The two security Requirements are expressed using Avoid category.
1) avoids that an agreement received by the Meeting scheduler becomes unavailable  this is a
serious problem since agreements are a kind of contracts between initiator and participants  and
2) avoids that the information and particularly the date of the agreement is modified.
The second alternative is AgreementDateFoundByTalkingToInitiator and it has to be con-
sidered in conjunction with the two previously described security Requirements. Either by the first
or the second alternative, both are achieved performing two sub-goals: ScheduleOfAgreement-
OnMeetingMReceived and AgreeableSlotForMeetingMFound. To receive the schedule of all in-
terested participants, the Requirement ProposedDateSentToParticipants and its results  the
Goal ParticipantsResponseConcerningTheProposedDateForMeetingMReceived 
have to be fulfilled. This Goal is refined into an Expectation (previously described) and a security
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Figure 10.16: Meeting scheduler system refined until Requirements and Expectations: focus on
the participant Agent
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Figure 10.17: Meeting scheduler system refined until Requirements and Expectations: focus on
the scheduler Agent
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Figure 10.18: Refinement of the goal Agreement on meeting M schedule received
Requirement DisclosureOfAgreementDateForUnauthorizedParticipants that avoids that the
date of agreement for a meeting M to be disclosed to unauthorized participants  participants
attending other meetings. We can operationalize this requirement as presented in Fig. 10.19. To
avoid date to be disclosed, the Meeting scheduler checks the identity of participants who want
to manipulate an agreement. Input of the CheckParticipantIdentity operation is the Meeting
participant Object and the output is an access to the Database containing agreements and a
specific Agreement.
Figure 10.19: Operationalization of Requirement DisclosureOfAgreementDateToUnauthorized-
Participants
Let us now consider the refinement of the Goal AgreeableSlotForMeetingM in Fig. 10.20. It is
decomposed into three Requirements a) SelectDateForMeetingMInTheAvailableDatesCommon-
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ToAllParticipants, b) TryToSelectADatePreferredByAllParticipants and c) RespectEx-
cludedDatesFromParticipants. The meaning of these three Requirements is obvious from their
labels.
Figure 10.20: Refinement of the goal Agreeable slot for meeting M found
The object model is presented in Fig. 10.21. The model contains three Objects representing
agents: MeetingInitiator, MeetingParticipant and MeetingScheduler. The MeetingSche-
duler helps the MeetingInitiator to schedule meetings and it interacts with MeetingPartici-
pants. The notion of Date is crucial for our case study as this object represents the threatened
concept of the system. Date can be refined into two sub-classes: ExcludedDates and Available-
Dates. ExcludedDates of participant P are dates that cannot be chosen to schedule a meeting
if P has to attend the meeting. AvailableDates gather PreferredDates of participants and the
date proposed by the Meeting scheduler. The Agreement object corresponds to the Agreement as
defined previously in the description of the case study. It has a date as attribute and it is linked
to ProposedDate, meaning that an agreement is obtained on a specific ProposedDate. Meeting-
Participants send their Preferred and ExcludedDates to the Meeting scheduler in the form of
a SetOfDates. Agreements are stored in a Database managed by the MeetingScheduler. Other
Objects of the object model will be discussed after the analysis of security.
We analyse the Meeting scheduler system from the point of view of a potential attacker by
designing the Anti-goal model. We described the potential attack performed by an attacker who
wants to breach the security criterion of privacy of the system (see Fig. 10.22). We proposed
to change the category of the privacy Requirement Avoid [DisclosureOfTheAgreementDateTo-
UnauthorizedParticipants] into Achieve [DisclosureOfTheAgreementDateToUnauthorized-
Participants]. To achieve this root Goal, the attacker first needs to InfiltrateTheMeeting-
SchedulerSystem and after to GetRelevantDateOfAgreement. In order to get the relevant date,
the attacker has to AccessTheAgreement, OnceInTheSystemStealDateOfAgreement and finally to
RevealStolenDate. By refining the theft of date, we distinguish three requirements and a domain
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Figure 10.21: Object model of the meeting scheduler system (adapted from [Yu97])
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property. Achieve [ReadDate], Achieve [CopyDate] and Achieve [StoreStolenDate] are the
attacker's versions of the requirement of type Avoid previously elicited. The attack method of the
attacker is defined as the operationalization of the three requirements. The exploited vulnerability
is described in the Domain property AgreementsAreNotEncrypted.
Figure 10.22: Goal model of the privacy attacker
We operationalize the three Requirements to elicit the attack method. Achieve [ReadDateOf-
TheAgreement] is operationalized into two Operations: a) NavigateInAgreementsDatabase and
b) ReadDateOfAgreementsOfAParticipantToMeetingM. To find the agreement containing the rel-
evant date to reveal, the attacker has to perform the operation a) using as input the Database
object. After that, in b), he uses the agreement to read the date it contains.
Then in Fig. 10.24 we consider the second requirement Achieve [CopyDate] that is imple-
mented by two operations: c) SelectTheRelevantDateOfAgreement and d) MakeACopyOfThe-
DateOfAgreement. The relevant date is known as a result of the operation read relevant date
presented in Fig. 10.23. As we model each requirement in separate diagram, we described the
selection of the relevant date as a more general operation using Database and Agreement objects.
Once the date retrieved from the agreement, the next operation is d) which results in a new object
StolenDateFromAgreement. The new Object is added to the Anti-object model (described in the
sequel of the thesis).
The last step of the attack method is to Achieve [StoreStolenDate]. The related operation
is StoreStolenDateInDatabase, taking as input the StolenDateFromAnAgreement and resulting
in storing the stolen date into the AttackerDatabase. The AttackerDatabase Object is a new
Object of the Anti-object model. The operationalization of Achieve [StoreStolenDate] is pre-
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sented in Fig. 10.25.
Figure 10.23: Operationalization of the attacker's requirement Achieve [ReaDate]
The Anti-object model is depicted in Fig. 10.26. Besides StolenDateFromAgreement and At-
tackerDatabase, it contains two other Objects: the MeetingAttacker  the actor who performs
the attack against the system  and the UnauthorizedParticipant  actor to whom dates are
revealed.
We are now entering the last step of the modelling of the case study using KeS. Since we
have investigated a potential attack against the system-to-be, we need to consider how to deal
with the security breach. We choose to mitigate the risk consisting in the DisclosureOfDate-
OfAgreements by using cryptographic procedures on the agreement's data. We build a new goal
model Fig. 10.27 as a copy of Fig. 10.18 containing a new requirement Achieve [Agreements-
AreEncrypted]. We operationalize this new requirement as the UseCryptographicProcedures
operation as depicted in Fig. 10.28. It uses, as inputs, Agreement object and CryptographicKeys
 new Object added to object model  and it produces an EncryptedAgreement  new Object too.
The object model contains two non described Objects: the Firewall Object and the Access
Control List Object. They are used to treat other security breaches against availability and
integrity criteria. We do not discuss these breaches.
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Figure 10.24: Operationalization of the attacker's requirement Achieve [CopyDate]
Figure 10.25: Operationalization of the attacker's requirement Achieve [StoreStolenDate]
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Figure 10.26: Anti-object model for the privacy attacker
Figure 10.27: Goal model extended with countermeasures against privacy attack
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Figure 10.28: Operationalization of the requirement AgreementsAreEncrypted
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10.3 Exploitation of the Case Study
After the modelling of the Meeting scheduler system using the secure TROPOS and KeS
languages, we can analyse models that have been produced. First we detail the objectives of the
exploitation of the case study and then we discuss the models obtained.
10.3.1 Analysis of the Case Study
We now discuss the models produced in secure TROPOS and in KeS. We have selected a set of
relevant elements of the Meeting scheduler case study in Table 10.1 and, for each line, we indicate
how the concept was modelled in secure TROPOS and KeS respectively. The discussion follows
Table 10.1 line by line. We first describe how an element is modelled in the secure TROPOS
language and after in the KeS language.
(e1)(e2)(e3) The three first relevant elements of the case study are the three actors of the
system: the Meeting initiator, the Meeting participant and the Meeting scheduler. Each of them
is represented in secure TROPOS using the concept of actor (Fig. 10.1) and in KeS using the
concept of Agent Fig. 10.14. The two first Agents are equivalent to ISSRM Business assets while
the third corresponds to an IS asset.
(e5) (e6) (e7) Participants can also give their agreement to a proposed date. As for preferred
and excluded dates, Agreement (Fig. 10.5) is a Resource in secure TROPOS and an Object in
KeS (Fig. 10.19). It corresponds to a Business asset. The same explanation can be given for the
proposed date which is modelled using the same kind of concept (Fig. 10.5, Fig. 10.21) but in it
this case, it is equivalent to an IS asset.
(e4) The Meeting initiator wants the meeting to be scheduled. This is modelled in secure
TROPOS using a Goal MeetingBeScheduled (Fig. 10.1) and in KeS using also a Goal Meeting-
BeScheduled (Fig. 10.15). This element of the case study is an ISSRM IS asset.
(e8) One of the security concerns of the Meeting scheduler is the privacy criterion. A Softgoal
Privacy Fig. 10.13 is used in secure TROPOS; in KeS it is labelled PrivacyOfTheMeeting-
SchedulerSystem. It corresponds to a security criterion.
(e9) Another element of the Meeting scheduler that is equivalent to the ISSRM security crite-
rion is the constraint imposing that agreements can only be used by participants to meeting M. It
is modelled as a security Constraint and/or a Softgoal in secure TROPOS (Fig. 10.6). There is no
equivalent of the security Constraint in KeS but we have a KeS Softgoal PrivacyOfTheMeeting-
SchedulerSystem.
(e10) The attacker against the privacy of the system is represented as an Actor called Privacy-
Attacker in secure TROPOS Fig. 10.12 and as an Agent Attacker in KeS Fig. 10.23. This attacker
is aligned on the ISSRM threat agent concept.
(e11) The vulnerability (also ISSRM vulnerability) that is exploited by the described attack
against privacy is the fact that agreements are not encrypted in the Meeting scheduler system. In
Fig. 10.12, we see that this vulnerability is designed as a Belief AgreementsAreNotEncrypted in
secure TROPOS, and in Fig. 10.22 as a Domain property AgreementsAreNotEncrypted.
(e12) The attack method (equivalent to ISSRM attack method) consists in disclosing agree-
ments and, more precisely, the date of a specific agreement. This is modelled in secure TRO-
POS by two Plans, ReadAgreements and SendToUnauthorizedPeople, and the attacks relation-
ship (see Fig. 10.12). In KeS, we have to look at a set of Operations NavigateTheDatabase-
Agreements and ReadDateOfAgreementOfAParticipantToMeetingM Fig. 10.23, MakeACopyOf-
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TheDateOfAgreement (Fig. 10.24) and StoreStolenDateInDatabase (Fig. 10.25).
(e13) An attacker against privacy wants to disclose agreements to unauthorized participants.
This is equivalent to the ISSRM concepts of Threat. In secure TROPOS, it is described as a
unique Goal DisclosureOfAgreements (Fig. 10.12) just as in KeS where we have the Require-
ment Achieve [DisclosureOfAgreementDateToUnauthorizedParticipants] (Fig. 10.22).
(e14) The system is exposed to the cause of the risk of a disclosure attack. As we can see this
can be aligned with the ISSRM notion of Cause of the risk. The concept of a secure TROPOS
Threat is used to model this cause of the risk (Fig. 10.8). On the other hand, this concept is mixed
with the KeS Threat.
(e15) The elaboration of countermeasure begins by taking a decision about the response to an
identified risk. In our case, we choose to mitigate the risk by adding a new security requirement.
The decision has no construct in secure TROPOS, nor in KeS. However, the KeS documentation
explicitly speaks about the process of taking decision when facing of a risk. In the ISSRM domain
model, it is called the Risk treatment decision.
(e16) The envisaged (ISSRM) security requirement in the case of the risk against privacy
is the use of cryptographic procedures. We can represent it in secure TROPOS with a Plan
PerformCryptographicProcedures (Fig. 10.13) and in KeS as an Operation UseCryptographic-
Procedures (Fig. 10.28).
The ISSRM notion of control has no specific concept neither in secure TROPOS, nor in KeS.
But in the two languages, it is the iterative aspect of their methods that make the countermeasures
of an iteration, the new controls and assets of the next iteration.
None of the elements of the meeting scheduler case study is modelled in secure TROPOS (re-
spectively in KeS) using a concept X that is aligned on the ISSRM concept Y and in KeS using
a concept Z that is not aligned with Y. Hence, our alignment of concepts of metamodels of these
two languages is not invalidated by our case study.
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Elements of
case study
Secure TROPOS
modelling
KeS modelling
ISSRM
domain
model
e1 Meeting initiator Actor [Meeting Initiator]
Agent [Meeting
Initiator]
Business
asset
e2 Meeting
participant
Actor [Meeting
Participant]
Agent [Meeting
Participant]
Business
asset
e3 Meeting
scheduler
Actor [Meeting Scheduler]
Agent [Meeting
Scheduler]
IS asset
e4
Initiator wants
meetings be
scheduled
Goal [Meeting Be
Scheduled]
Goal [Meeting Be
Scheduled]
IS asset
e5
Participants
preferred and
excluded dates
Resource [Preferred And
Excluded Dates]
Object [Excluded
Dates] + Object
[Preferred Dates]
Business
asset
e6 Agreement for
meeting M
Resource [Agreement (for
meeting M)]
Object [Agreement
(for meeting M)]
Business
asset
e7 Proposed date
for meeting M
Resource [Proposed Date]
Object [Proposed
Date]
IS asset
e8
System must
ensured privacy
of its data
Softgoal [Privacy]
Softgoal [Privacy Of
The Meeting
Scheduler System]
Security
criterion
e9
Agreements can
only be used by
participants to M
Security constraint [Only
Used By Participants To
M]

Security
criterion
e10 Attacker of
privacy
Actor [Privacy Attacker] Agent [Attacker] Threat agent
e11 Agreements are
not encrypted
Belief [Agreements Are
Not Encrypted]
Domain property
[Agreements Are Not
Encrypted]
Vulnerability
e12
Attack system by
disclosing
agreements
Plan [Read Agreements]
+ Plan[Send To
Unauthorized
Participants] + attacks
link
Operation [Navigate
The Database
Agreements] +
Operation [Read Date
Of Agreement Of A
Participant To
Meeting M] +
Operation [Make A
Copy Of The Date Of
Agreement] +
Operation [Store
Stolen Date In
Database]
Attack
method
130 Chapter 10 Validation
e13
Attacker of
privacy wants to
disclose
agreements to
unauthorized
participants
Goal [Disclosure Of
Agreements]
Requirement [
Achieve[Disclosure Of
Agreement Date To
Unauthorized
Participants] ]
Cause of the
Risk and
Threat
e14
The system is
exposed to the
risk of a
disclosure attack
Threat [Disclosure
Attack]
 Risk
e15
The risk of
disclosure
agreements is
mitigated by
encrypting
agreements in the
scheduler system
 Anti-goal mitigation
Risk
treatment
decision
e16
To perform
cryptographic
procedures to
mitigates risk of
disclosure
agreements
Plan [(S) Perform
Cryptographic
Procedures]
Operation [ Use
Cryptographic
Procedures ]
Security
requirement
Table 10.1: Modelling of main elements of meeting scheduler case
study using the secure TROPOS and KeS languages
10.3.2 Observation of the Case Study
By analysing our Meeting Scheduler case study, we can formulate several findings:
• all elements of the Meeting scheduler, that we modelled either in secure TROPOS either in
KeS, used concepts of the metamodel of the corresponding language;
• all instances of the concepts of the metamodels are aligned with the same ISSRM concept
as the concept it is an instance of. So a concept and its instance (in secure TROPOS or in
KeS) are aligned with the same ISSRM concept. This validates our alignment as presented
in Tables 9.2 and 9.3;
• secure TROPOS and KeS use notion of Goal but with an underlying semantic that differs for
each of them. In secure TROPOS, the Actor who owns the Goal, which is what he wants.
In KeS, the Agent is responsible for the achievement of the Goal. Thus, the goal is not
what he wants, but what he is responsible for;
• the modelling process is very different in secure TROPOS and in KeS. The manner the ana-
lyst has to tackle the problem is focused on the notion of Actors and their inter-dependencies
in secure TROPOS, while in KeS, he has to find the main Goal of the system-to-be and refine
it until he reaches Requirements. Agents responsible for achieving these Requirements are
then elicited;
• secure TROPOS and KeS do not focus on the same level of modelling. Secure TROPOS
limits its scope to Plans of a quite high level of abstraction. On the other hand, KeS uses
Operation model where Requirements are decomposed into steps that form the process to
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fulfill the Requirement. This is a great distinction when we analyse the attack method of
possible attackers as KeS attack methods are more refined than in secure TROPOS;
• the label of a Goal, a Requirement or an Object in KeS plays a crucial role to determine if
these concepts are used with concerns for security. We find that having such an important
distinction (security concerns) only expressed by the words used to describe a concept is
insufficient and error-prone. Indeed, labels are written in natural language which is one
of the most ambiguous way to communicate. The use of the (S) tag in secure TROPOS
improves this situation but remains related to only the sole label of the construct;
• the notion of ISSRM Vulnerability has an equivalence in KeS (Domain property) but not re-
ally in secure TROPOS. As we discussed previously, Beliefs used to represent Vulnerabilities
do not have the same semantic as for Vulnerabilities;
• KeS does not allow to consider a Goal as an ISSRM asset. But based on the experience of
the Meeting scheduler case study, it seems that this concept should be added to the set of
KeS concepts that can be considered as ISSRM assets.
10.3.3 Threats to Validity
The ideal case study is quite impossible to reach. A case study always suffers of limitations 
also called threats to its validity. General limitations of case studies are, for example:
• reduction of the domain of the IS in order to fit the scope of the problem to treat;
• increased focus on positive results and vague discussion of negative outcomes.
In the case of the Meeting Scheduler System, we point out another threat which is that we
modelled the case study using the secure TROPOS language and the KeS language. Ideally
this work should be done by two distinct teams (or analysts) without being aware of how the
Meeting Scheduler is designed in another language. Indeed, in this case, we played the triple
role of designer, analyst and judge of the modelling of the Meeting Scheduler and the analysis of
alignment between secure TROPOS and KeS with the ISSRM domain model. The objectivity is
thus not always simple to reach. This situation is reflected by a low level of refinement of some
parts of the Meeting scheduler using a language that offers the possibility to be more precise. So
it is not always easy to know if the level of details of a model is due to the language itself or to
keep comparable concepts.
10.4 Summary
In order to validate our alignments of the concepts of the secure TROPOS and the KeS lan-
guages with those of the ISSRM domain model, we modelled the Meeting Scheduler case study
 based on [Yu97, FFFvL97, Let01]  using the secure TROPOS and the KeS languages. We
summarise how relevant elements of the Meeting Scheduler are modelled using these two security
modelling languages. By analysing the summary, we validate our previous alignments. Finally, we
discussed threats to the validity of these alignments due to the inherent limitations of case studies
and to the way we elaborated our Meeting Scheduler System.

Part IV
Conclusions
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Chapter11
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter aims to present our conclusions on the results and findings of this thesis, and
discuss future work that can be envisaged according to outcomes of the thesis.
11.1 Conclusions
At the beginning of this thesis, we addressed three problems that were stated as objectives of
this work:
1. to investigate relationships between ISSRM domain model [MMHD07] concepts that were
elicited in previous works in order to complete and improve the ISSRM domain model;
2. to analyse how existing security modelling languages  such as KeS [vL04], secure TRO-
POS [MJF06]  consider security concerns. We analyse what are the concepts of the ISSRM
domain model that are treated in security modelling languages;
3. to elicit potential improvements of the ISSRM domain model  depending on the results of
the analysis of security modelling languages  and also potential improvements to security
modelling languages in order to make them supporting ISSRM concepts.
We thus choose to elicit ISSRM relationships from security and risk related sources in order to
complete the ISSRM domain model. To fulfill this objective, we investigate source documents of
security and risk related sources  for example, EBIOS v2 [DCS04], ISO/IEC 27001 [ISO05] and
Firesmith [Fir03]  to elicit all relationships between concepts of each source. By analysing and
summarising discovered relationships, we introduced associations between concepts of the ISSRM
domain model.
Once relationships added on the ISSRM domain model, we analysed security modelling lan-
guages KeS and secure TROPOS in order to align them with the ISSRM domain model and
explicit the covering of concepts of these languages and concepts of ISSRM domain model covers
each. By this way, we addressed our second objective.
To fulfill our first objectives, we described the fundamental concepts in the understanding of
the security and risk management domain. Then we survey the most relevant security and risk
related sources. The way we achieve our second objective is presented in the research method (see
Chapter 4) where we contributes to steps 2 and 3. Outcome of step 2 is a glossary gathering all
relevant parts of the source documents that confirm the existence of relationships. We use it to
enhance the ISSRM domain model. We then performed a part of the step 3 that corresponds to
the elicitation of the mutual covering of ISSRM domain model and security modelling languages.
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We validate our alignments by elaborating a case study based on the Meeting Scheduler System.
This leads to discussion of the limits of the validity. Finally we exploited results of alignments
to fulfill our third objective, that is, making suggestions to the enhancements of ISSRM domain
model and improvements of security modelling languages.
Conclusions of this thesis are grouped according to stage of the thesis that they concern. First,
we present conclusions on the method we used to fulfill our objectives and then on the results of
the thesis.
11.1.1 Conclusions on the Method used to fulfill the Objectives of the
Thesis
Conclusions on the method we choose to achieve the objectives of the thesis are:
• when aligning concepts, this process needs to rely on a very detailed and precised under-
standing of the investigated languages. The differences between the alignment of the KeS
language as we performed first (see Appendix 3) and the alignment described in Chapter 9
illustrate this point. It is absolutely necessary to analyse the metamodel of investigated
languages;
• as we discussed, results have to be validated. The usage of case studies are a mean to achieve
this validation but the assessment by the experts of the domain reinforce the validity of the
results.
11.1.2 Conclusions on the results of the Thesis
We now considerate conclusions on the results of the thesis:
• security in IS is not optional anymore. It has to be address during the whole development
of a IS;
• at this time, there is no method that addresses all security aspects in a consistent and
structured way. Thus reinforce the need of a reference document as the ISSRM domain
model;
• moreover, imposing a new security modelling languages seems to be hopeless. Practitioners
are rather inclined to keep their existing methods and languages;
• we contributed to the enhancement of the ISSRM domain model by eliciting relationships
between its concepts. With these improvements, the ISSRM domain model can now be
considered as reference document for practitioners who elaborate secure IS. It can be used
as a set of guidelines to ensure that all security concepts of the ISSRM domain model
are taken into account when modellers design system. Such a document can improve the
situations presented in the previous conclusions;
• decomposing the ISSRM domain model into three blocks  asset, risk and countermeasures
 allows practitioners to focus only on one block at once. Moreover, when they investigate
a specific block, they know which are concepts that need to be taken into account;
• even if the ISSRM domain model seems to be sufficiently mature, some of its concepts need to
be clarified. For example, the concept of Cause of the risk that is defined as "the combination
of a threat and one or more vulnerabilities". Only defining this concept as the combination
of two other does not really express its semantic.
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11.2 Future Work
We split future work into two separate concerns. The first is about the development of the
ISSRM domain model while the second concerns the enhancement of the secure TROPOS and the
KeS languages.
11.2.1 Development of the ISSRM domain model
One of the most paramount questions to answer in the future is: Will the ISSRM domain
model be supported by :
• a new language developed especially for it;
• a set of existing security modelling languages in which only some concepts will be retained
and the corresponding analysis process will be kept. Gathering all the retained concepts will
lead to the full syntax of the ISSRM domain model and using all parts of analysis processes
will form the process to analyse the ISSRM domain model;
• a unique existing modelling language extended by new concepts that are not present at this
time in the languages. The extension will produce a full covering of the ISSRM domain
model concepts;
So there are three alternatives that can be considered. However, according to our conclusions
(see previously) the ISSRM domain model should be presented as a reference document gathering
all relevant security concepts that have to be taken into account when building secure systems.
Thus future work on the ISSRM domain model should aim to define guidelines and/or processes
that can be applied by a modeller in order to ensure specific security aspects in a system-to-be.
11.2.2 Future Investigations in the Secure TROPOS and the KeS Lan-
guages
As previously said, the results of our alignment can be used to enhance the secure TROPOS
and the KeS languages. We gave remarks, at the end of Chapter 10, about lacks in the process or
in the concepts of these two languages. Some suggestions from improvement are:
• to label components of models respecting a specific pattern. For example, the first term of
the label of Goals in secure TROPOS and KeS should be a name. On the other hand, a
verb should be the first term of labels of secure TROPOS Plan and KeS Operation. This
difference makes clearer the meaning of objective of a Goal and of the meaning of process of
a Plan and an Operation;
• we need to differentiate elements of the system-to-be that are related to the security. Secure
TROPOS introduced the (S) tag to indicate that a element is considered with respect to
security. The same kind of distinction should be introduced in the KeS language;
• secure TROPOS needs a some extra concepts to fully support the concepts of the ISSRM
notion. If we consider the ISSRM Vulnerability, this concept cannot be fully supported by
the secure TROPOS belief (reasons are described in Chapter 10). We suggest to create a
new construct to modelled the ISSRM Vulnerability;
• to build some patterns in each languages in order to pre-design concepts while modelling.
In this way, the analyst will be proposed to complete the labels of the predefined constructs
that represents the ISSRM concept that he wants to express.
As we can see, the domain of the ISSRM modelling is not yet worn out and a lot of work is
still to be done.
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